World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

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126 6 Conflict constellations in Niger). The number of countries pursuing their own interest in resources in the region has steadily increased, with Russia and China joining the ranks of the traditional stakeholders such as France, Great Britain and the USA. The population of the region has become increasingly dissatisfied with what is seen as a ‘sell-out’ of national resources; as a result, attacks in the infrastructure of resource extraction are becoming more and more common. In the first decades of the 21st century China’s political and economic power becomes increasingly significant. After the USA China is now the second largest economy in the world; in the pursuit of its resource interests it is beginning to do deals with those in power in the region, a move that is increasingly seen by western states as a threat to their own interests. The drastically increased severity of the water shortage throughout the region leads to an armed international confrontation in the Nile catchment area: Egypt, which is 95 per cent dependent on water from the Nile, is concerned about Ethiopia’s plan to safeguard its own water requirements by building a dam on the Blue Nile. The international community intervenes in an effort to negotiate a treaty that would regulate the use of Nile water on conditions that would be fair to all the countries involved, but the attempt founders. The Egyptian government then despatches troops to occupy the province of Amhara in northwest Ethiopia. Developments in North Africa have a significant impact on Europe. The European countries that are the primary destination of migrants have a need for workers, but the need is far exceeded by the number of illegal immigrants. Because illegal migrants are not integrated into society, there is increased ghettoization of North African immigrants. Xenophobia increases, and the immigrants react to their difficult circumstances by turning in large numbers to radical religious groups (a choice favoured by the huge popularity of these movements in the migrants’ home countries). European countries fear that immigration from North Africa will allow the infiltration of more and more members of extremist groups into Europe, and so they take steps to strengthen ‘Fortress Europe’. Under the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU and NATO, increasingly high priority is given to measures to halt the influx of illegal migrants from the Mediterranean area. All the North African countries with the exception of Egypt have signed an agreement with the EU that commits them – in return for compensation payments – to stemming the tide of migration in their own country. With the support of European states, internment camps are set up on the edge of the Sahara; there are reports of revolts within the camps and of force being used in ways that infringe human rights. Fictitious cooperation scenario: Adaptation succeeds with international help The following scenario can be imagined: the positive scenario arises from similar changes in the natural environment. It is based, however, on the assumption that both at domestic level and internationally, the steps that need to be taken are promptly identified and effectively implemented. With considerable support from the international community in sustainable methods of resource management and soil cultivation, desertification is slowed in many parts of the region and in some places even stopped. As part of these measures agriculture is extensified rather than intensified; job losses are prevented, however, because mechanization of agriculture is avoided and the market for sustainably produced products guarantees increased sales opportunities and higher prices on the world market. In large parts of the Sahel this now provides local communities with adequate income to ensure their livelihood; as a result what was previously a driving force of migration has significantly diminished. Conflicts between regional ethnic groups and central states – such as the hostility between the Tuareg and the governments of various Sahel countries that has been simmering for years – have been checked by the consistent promotion of participatory and federal political structures. The rising revenue from the extraction of mineral resources provides North African states with the funds needed to introduce economic and pol itical reforms, which lead to a reduction in social problems. There is a noticeable opening up of previously autocratic regimes. A similar process takes place in some of the Sahel countries, where money brought in by the resource extraction sector is used to finance improvements to social infrastructure. International cooperation also plays a significant part in the positive trend. Under the Barcelona Process of the European-Mediterranean Partnership, the Mediterranean area is established as a region, a move that paves the way for cross-border cooperation transcending religious and cultural divides and gives concrete form to this cooperation. An example of such collaboration is the migration policy model, which envisages that European countries will accept a certain number of labour migrants each year. It anticipates quotas for citizens from North African states and from other African countries. This defuses the situation. There is rapprochement between the affected countries themselves. As members of the Maghreb Union the North African states have agreed on the creation of a regional economic area and are working towards making this a reality. In the Nile catchment area the expansion of the ‘Nile Basin Initiative’ has resulted in a successful international cooperation
programme that is making a significant contribution both to tackling desertification and to political stability in the region. 6.5.4 Recommendations for action Environmental stress only develops its potential to trigger conflict when it is compounded by adverse social, economic and political circumstances (Clark, 2006). As shown, there are many key factors that exert an influence on the different phases of the conflict constellation. Thus possible political action strat egies for the avoidance of conflict are correspondingly diverse in nature. Bearing in mind the analysis of causal linkages and the outcomes of the scenarios described above, possible strategies will now be described in more detail. 6.5.4.1 Avoiding environmentally induced migration Avoiding dangerous climate change: The selection of efficient and effective political strategies should focus first on the avoidance of environmentally induced migration. The most important strategy here is the avoidance of dangerous climate change (Section 10.3.2). Reducing vulnerability: Even large-scale avoi dance measures will now not completely avert the effects of climate change. There is therefore a need for the development of regional and national strategies to reduce the vulnerability of the local population and structures to these effects. Such strategies are a way of reducing environmentally induced migration. Appropriate measures include not only efficient coastal and irrigation management systems but also disaster prevention instruments, early warning systems, disaster relief plans and plans for the coordination of reconstruction measures in the wake of natural disasters (Sections 6.2, 6.3, 6.4; WBGU, 2006). Emigration can also be reduced by exerting an influence on social, economic and political factors; for instance, by promoting economic growth and more equitable distribution of its benefits. Specific factors that reduce individuals’ vulnerability are effective social and micro-insurance systems, adequate health provision and strong government institutions (WBGU, 2005, 2006). Conflict constellation: ‘Environmentally induced migration’ 6.5 6.5.4.2 Managing environmentally induced migration If migration flows cannot be halted, strategies to control environmentally induced migration can help prevent conflict. Environmental migrants need not in evitably represent a security risk if receiving countries take appropriate measures. Sudden environmentally induced migration after extreme events Accompanying measures: The first step in the management of temporary environmentally induced migration after extremes of weather is to put disaster relief measures in place; in particular, this involves setting up emergency settlements and refugee camps. In order to reduce the potential for conflict, it is important to ensure that migrants are adequately provided with food and medical care. In addition, steps should be taken to prevent the infiltration of rebels and the spread of weapons in refugee camps. These should be erected as far away from conflict regions as possible and at sufficient distance from national borders, in order to avoid being affected by the overspill of existing conflicts. Conflicts can arise if different ethnic groups have differential access to aid and locally available resources; aid measures should therefore be adapted to local needs, with the resident population being involved in the relevant decisionmaking processes (OECD-DAC, 2003). Extremes of weather, in particular, can suddenly trigger the migration of large numbers of people, who exceed the absorptive capacity of the region in which they arrive. Such situations call for multilateral strategies, such as agreements under which other countries temporarily take in environmental migrants. In the case of developing countries, which will normally be dependent in such cases on the financial support of international donors, the financing and implementation of such strategies can – as in the past – be coordinated under the aegis of the UN, in particular the UNHCR. Government-induced environmentally induced migration: If the threat posed by sudden environmental changes in a region is so severe that protective measures are no longer politically or economically justified, the state itself may encourage migration. In high-risk areas such as coasts exposed to tornadoes and storm floods, national resettlement programmes prepared for such a contingency would ensure that migration takes place in more orderly fashion than might be the case if there were a sudden mass exodus after an extreme weather event. They could also ensure that the conditions awaiting displaced people in the desti- 127
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Climate Change as a Security Risk G
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Members of the German Advisory Coun
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German Advisory Council on Global C
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VI Council Staff and Acknowledgment
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VIII Contents 3.3.2 Economic factor
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X Contents 6.5.4.1 Avoiding environ
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XII Contents 10.3.2 Climate policy
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Tables Table 2.2-1 Main differences
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XVI Figures Figure 8.1-2 Climate st
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XVIII Acronyms and Abbreviations FI
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A new security policy challenge Sum
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ilization, the collapse of social s
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Six threats to international stabil
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Fostering a cooperative setting for
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firmed by the European Council, a b
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Initiative 8: Managing migration th
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which are not should satisfy the
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16 1 Introduction the present state
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Broadening the concept of security
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Messner, 2004; Klingebiel and Roehd
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Box 2.2-1 Worldwatch Institute: Cha
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26 3 Known conflict impacts of envi
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42 4 Rising conflict risks due to s
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56 5 Impacts of climate change on t
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Page 131 and 132: Figure 6.4-3 Conflict constellation
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Page 135 and 136: 6.4.3.2 Hurricane risks in the Gulf
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Page 180 and 181: 158 8 Climate change as a driver of
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176 8 Climate change as a driver of
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178 9 Research recommendations Tipp
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180 9 Research recommendations toge
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182 9 Research recommendations 2020
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184 9 Research recommendations ture
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186 9 Research recommendations wate
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188 9 Research recommendations tion
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190 10 Recommendations for action t
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192 10 Recommendations for action b
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194 10 Recommendations for action f
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196 10 Recommendations for action a
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198 10 Recommendations for action d
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200 10 Recommendations for action A
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204 10 Recommendations for action s
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206 10 Recommendations for action G
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208 10 Recommendations for action 1
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212 10 Recommendations for action n
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Abel, W (1974) Massenarmut und Hung
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BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt,
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36. University Amsterdam, Faculteit
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for Action. Global Commission on In
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library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/stabsabte
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- a review’. In Kreimer, A, Arnol
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ics in the Southern Brazilian Amazo
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No. 113. UNHCR Evaluation and Polic
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Stockle, C O, Dyke, P T, Williams,
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WBGU (German Advisory Council on Gl
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Action Plan ‘Crisis Prevention’
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er countries in 2001 at the 4th Min
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focuses on the security needs of hu
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towards the future as plausible ‘
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Index A Aceh 107 Africa 70-71, 72,
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Framework Convention on Climate Cha
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208, 211 security strategies 19, 21
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