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World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

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172<br />

8 <strong>Climate</strong> change <strong>as</strong> a driver of social destabilization and threat to <strong>in</strong>ternational security<br />

Box 8.3-1<br />

The major newly <strong>in</strong>dustrializ<strong>in</strong>g countries’<br />

possible future share of global greenhouse g<strong>as</strong><br />

emissions<br />

In 2000, Ch<strong>in</strong>a accounted for around 12 per cent of the<br />

world’s total greenhouse g<strong>as</strong> emissions. India’s share w<strong>as</strong><br />

4.5 per cent, Brazil’s 5.3 per cent, and the OECD countries’<br />

share w<strong>as</strong> 37 per cent (CAIT WRI, 2007). The emissions<br />

can be broadly categorized <strong>as</strong> CO 2 emissions from land use<br />

changes, CO 2 emissions from fossil fuels, and emissions of<br />

other greenhouse g<strong>as</strong>es (non-CO 2 emissions, e.g. methane,<br />

nitrous oxide).<br />

In 2004, around 20 per cent of global greenhouse g<strong>as</strong><br />

emissions consisted of CO 2 result<strong>in</strong>g from land use changes<br />

(Fig. 8.3-1). Among the countries listed, this especially<br />

affects Brazil: Its CO 2 emissions from land use changes<br />

(ma<strong>in</strong>ly from deforestation <strong>in</strong> the Amazon region) are currently<br />

four times higher than its energy-related emissions<br />

and account for around two-thirds of its total emissions<br />

(CAIT WRI, 2007). In India and Ch<strong>in</strong>a, by contr<strong>as</strong>t, emissions<br />

from land use changes are negligible. Projections of<br />

CO 2 emissions from land use changes are extremely unreliable,<br />

but it is expected that emissions from deforestation <strong>in</strong><br />

the tropical regions will rema<strong>in</strong> high <strong>in</strong> the medium term<br />

(IPCC, 2007c). In view of the strong growth <strong>in</strong> total emissions,<br />

however, the relative share of emissions from land use<br />

changes will probably decre<strong>as</strong>e.<br />

Non-CO 2 emissions accounted for 23 per cent of global<br />

emissions <strong>in</strong> 2004 (IPCC, 2007c). Projections from the US<br />

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) show that global<br />

non-CO 2 emissions will rise by around 30 per cent to<br />

2020, but the relative shares of Ch<strong>in</strong>a, India and Brazil <strong>in</strong><br />

these emissions (currently 16 per cent, 6 per cent and 6.5<br />

per cent respectively) are likely to rema<strong>in</strong> fairly constant<br />

(EPA, 2006).<br />

The ma<strong>in</strong> driver beh<strong>in</strong>d the expected relative <strong>in</strong>cre<strong>as</strong>e<br />

<strong>in</strong> the significance of emissions from the newly <strong>in</strong>dustrial-<br />

conflict <strong>in</strong> global politics <strong>in</strong> the 21st century would<br />

therefore divide the ma<strong>in</strong> drivers of climate change<br />

and the poor countries most affected by it, and that<br />

this l<strong>in</strong>e of conflict will not only divide North and<br />

South but will also have a South-South dimension.<br />

B<strong>as</strong>ed on a detailed analysis of the various greenhouse<br />

g<strong>as</strong> emissions, a more differentiated separation<br />

<strong>in</strong>to ‘ma<strong>in</strong> drivers’ and ‘affected’ countries may be<br />

57 %<br />

CO 2 from<br />

fossil fuels<br />

20 %<br />

CO 2 from<br />

land use changes<br />

23 %<br />

Non-CO 2emissions<br />

(CH 4, N 2O, ...)<br />

Figure 8.3-1<br />

Rough breakdown of global greenhouse g<strong>as</strong> emissions <strong>in</strong><br />

2004.<br />

Source: <strong>WBGU</strong>, b<strong>as</strong>ed on IPCC, 2007c<br />

iz<strong>in</strong>g countries is therefore fossil fuel use. CO 2 from fossil<br />

sources not only accounted for the major share of current<br />

emissions <strong>in</strong> 2004, i.e. 57 per cent; these emissions are also<br />

<strong>in</strong>cre<strong>as</strong><strong>in</strong>g at a disproportionately high rate (IPCC, 2007c).<br />

There are numerous scenarios for these emissions which all<br />

show an <strong>in</strong>cre<strong>as</strong><strong>in</strong>g relative share for the newly <strong>in</strong>dustrializ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

countries. For illustrative purposes, Table 8.3-1 shows<br />

the percentage <strong>in</strong>cre<strong>as</strong>es of selected newly <strong>in</strong>dustrializ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

countries and the OECD countries <strong>in</strong> global energy-related<br />

CO 2 emissions b<strong>as</strong>ed on the IEA’s Alternative Policy Scenario<br />

(IEA, 2006c). The absolute level and the rapid growth<br />

of emissions from the newly <strong>in</strong>dustrializ<strong>in</strong>g countries make<br />

it clear that climate protection policy cannot succeed <strong>in</strong><br />

future without the participation of the newly <strong>in</strong>dustrializ<strong>in</strong>g<br />

countries.<br />

Table 8.3-1<br />

Global energy-related CO2 emissions and selected countries’/groups of countries’ shares <strong>in</strong> these emissions b<strong>as</strong>ed on<br />

the IEA’s Alternative Policy Scenario.<br />

Source: IEA, 2006c<br />

1990 2004 2015 2030<br />

Global energy-related<br />

CO2 emissions [Gt CO2] 20.5 26.1 31.6 34.1<br />

Ch<strong>in</strong>a’s share [%] 11.2 18.3 23.1 25.8<br />

India’s share [%] 2.9 4.2 4.8 5.9<br />

Brazil’s share [%] 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.3<br />

OECD’s share [%] 54.0 49.2 43.8 38.7<br />

appropriate among the <strong>in</strong>dustrialized countries too.<br />

However, <strong>in</strong> view of the development of North-South<br />

relations <strong>in</strong> the p<strong>as</strong>t and the ongo<strong>in</strong>g prosperity gap,<br />

such considerations will be of secondary importance<br />

for the conflicts that can be anticipated.<br />

There are many signs that the most powerful<br />

nations with<strong>in</strong> the <strong>in</strong>ternational system will come<br />

under very strong pressure to justify their actions

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