World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

constitutional theory and an end in itself; it is a political
necessity, enabling the state to perform the core
functions without which peaceful social relations in
the complex interaction of our modern societies are
well-nigh impossible.
In the analysis of states, it has proved helpful to
establish differentiated categories based on an idealtypical
continuum of state stability. At the positive
end of the spectrum, there is the fully-functioning
modern nation state which meets all three criteria
(e.g. Norway); at the negative end, there is the failed
state which, when measured against legal and formal
criteria, is barely recognizable as a state at all (e.g.
Somalia). Based on Schneckener (2004), four categories
representing diminishing quality of state stability
are presented, with distinctions being drawn
between consolidated, weak, fragile and failed states
(Box 4.2-1). However, the classification of the various
individual states can only ever be transitory, presenting
a snapshot of current conditions and trends,
and it is not always possible to draw a clear distinction
between weak and fragile states, for example
(Roehder, 2004; Schneckener, 2004).
Numerous examples bear witness to the ‘state fragility’
phenomenon in its various facets and forms.
From a regional perspective, sub-Saharan Africa is
particularly striking; many countries here can be classified
as weak (Mehler, 2002; Grimm and Klingebiel,
2007). Indeed, as many as one-third of them are considered
to be at acute risk of state failure (Roehder,
2004). However, examples of weak states also exist
in Asia (e.g. Afghanistan), South-East Europe (e.g.
the Serbian province of Kosovo) and South America
(e.g. Colombia).
Causes
It should be noted, first and foremost, that there is
still a lack of reliable empirical research about failed/
failing states, especially as regards the causes of state
failure processes. According to one plausible causal
model, state failure is triggered when the state first
Box 4.2-2
State fragility: Destabilizing factors
Structural factors: Conditions which relate to natural
features of a country, e.g. minerals or climate, and longterm
political, cultural and socio-economic characteristics,
e.g. ethnic diversity, demographic development,
‘colonial legacy’, regional power constellations.
Process factors: Conditions which in the medium term
trigger or drive the erosion of states, with the response
of the actors involved (especially elites) to internal or
eternal crises playing a key role. Includes political instru-
State fragility and the limits of governance 4.2
ceases to deliver essential public goods and thus forfeits
its legitimacy. Only then are the state’s own
institutions affected: the administrative apparatus’s
capacity to act gradually diminishes and the state
loses its tax sovereignty and monopoly on the use of
force, etc. (Lambach, 2005).
What is undisputed is that the erosion of the
state’s monopoly on the use of force often triggers
intrastate spirals of violence which in turn have a
destabilizing effect. Many security problems result
from the breakdown of law and order which typically
occurs first in peripheral border regions or urban
slums where the state has a low level of penetration.
The spread of organized crime and criminal violence
are then almost inevitable (Ottaway and Mair,
2004). The threat is compounded by corruption and
lack of capacity of the state’s law enforcement agencies
(especially the police), which leave a vacuum of
power that is then gradually filled by non-state actors
such as private security companies, vigilantes, militias
and warlords. To move closer to an analytical evaluation
of the causes of state fragility, a distinction can
be made between structural, process and trigger factors,
according to Schneckener (Box 4.2-2).
Manifestations
The weakening of state structures to the point of possible
state collapse by definition affects individual
states, so analysis must focus on the national level.
However, the phenomenon of state fragility becomes
a matter for international politics once the impacts
of such failure spill over the borders of the directly
affected state. Weak and fragile states have a destabilizing
effect on neighbouring states and regions,
e.g. through cross-border migration or black markets.
Furthermore, fragile states are considered to
be vulnerable to ‘ new wars’ (Kaldor, 1999) and, it is
assumed, can become safe havens for terrorist organizations
and centres for the trade of drugs and arms.
For that reason too, it is in the international community’s
interest not to ignore weak and fragile states
mentalization of social discontent or of ethnic/cultural
differences, political or religious extremism, separatist
tendencies, repression by the state, corruption and mismanagement,
privatization of violence, economic crises,
etc.
Trigger factors: Conditions which trigger abrupt change,
including factors which may result from longer-term
developments with a catalytic effect. Examples are military
intervention, refugee flows, military coups and revolution,
massive violent repression of the opposition (e.g.
massacres), social unrest, famine, civil war, etc.
Source: Schneckener, 2004
43