World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

50 4 Rising conflict risks due to state fragility
even rise further. China’s primary energy consumption
is expected to double again between 2004 and
2015, while India’s is predicted to increase by more
than one-third over the same period (World Energy
Outlook Reference Scenario; IEA, 2006c).
With the energy supply structures that are likely to
be in place over the medium term, the two countries’
growing energy needs will mainly be met from fossil
fuels, resulting in a strong increase in CO 2 emissions.
In 1990, China accounted for around 11 per cent of
the world’s CO 2 emissions, but this had already risen
to 18 per cent in 2004. Within the next few years,
China will take over from the USA as the world’s
largest CO 2 emitter. India’s share has also increased
from just 3 per cent to more than 4 per cent since
1990 (Fig. 4.3-1b).
As two of the world’s main emitters of CO 2, China
and India are also becoming increasingly important
in international climate policy. Without their constructive
participation in the further development
and implementation of international climate agreements
under the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the aim of
preventing dangerous anthropogenic climate change
will not be achieved (Scholz, 2006; Richerzhagen,
2007).
Both countries have signed and ratified the Kyoto
Protocol, but as non- Annex I countries, they have
not entered into any reduction commitments for
the period to 2012. China and India are also target
regions for CDM projects, by means of which Annex
I countries, i.e. the industrialized nations, undertake
to fulfil some of their own reduction commitments
abroad. The key issue is whether over the long term,
China and India will commit to emissions reductions
of their own and have the capacity to implement
them in time. At present, neither of these two countries
is showing any willingness to enter into commitments
(even voluntary commitments) to limit
their greenhouse gas emissions. Nonetheless, China
and India occupy divergent positions in the international
climate policy forums. The industrialized countries
are exerting very little pressure on India to take
on commitments in the near future. India itself is at
present categorically rejecting any prospect of differentiated
commitments in future on the grounds
that its per capita emissions are still very low, and
is drawing attention to its right to pursue ‘catch-up’
economic development (Hörig, 2006). Furthermore,
India is insistent that the responsibility for climate
change mitigation lies primarily with the industrialized
countries (Narain, 2006).
By contrast, far greater pressure is being exerted
by the industrialized countries on China to commit,
at the least, to progressive reductions or ‘no-lose’ targets
in the near future. As a result of its rapid eco-
nomic growth, China faces massive environmental
problems. According to official figures, China is now
spending 1.8 per cent of its GDP on environmental
protection, but environmental damage is costing
China 3 per cent of GDP. Indeed, other sources calculate
that 8-12% of China’s annual GDP is being
lost because of the severe consequences of environmental
pollution (Sternfeld, 2006; Heberer and Senz,
2006a).
For these reasons too, China currently has a key
interest in mitigation measures, not least in order to
be able to solve its own problems of local air pollution.
However, China is expecting active support
from the developed nations, in the form of international
research and technology transfer. As China
sees itself as a high-quality partner aiming to achieve
rapid progress in the development of its own technologies,
there are concerns in the industrialized countries
that this type of technology transfer could result
in the loss of their own competitive advantages, especially
in the field of renewable energies, also in view of
China’s uncertain legal position with regard to intellectual
property. Notwithstanding this basic willingness
to engage on climate change mitigation, China
has emphasized that while it is willing to adopt measures
on a voluntary basis, under no circumstances will
it enter into voluntary commitments within the climate
regime. It remains to be seen to what extent the
possibility of more far-reaching steps, as tentatively
implied in Chinese politics recently, will be pursued
further.
Growing global policy engagement by China
and India
As a result of the economic ‘catch-up’ processes in
China and India, these countries are intensifying
their global political engagement: China’s growing
presence in international politics can no longer be
ignored (Amineh, 2006; Gill, 2007). China’s engagement
in international organizations and its participation
in multilateral treaty systems has also increased
significantly since the 1970s and its previous strategy
of isolating itself internationally has given way
to a pro-active role in world affairs (Johnston, 2003;
Medeiros and Fravel, 2003; Heberer and Senz, 2006a).
The new diplomacy being pursued by the People’s
Republic is most apparent in Asia, where China was
a driving force in the establishment of the ASEAN+3
mechanism, a dialogue forum involving the South-
East Asian countries, Japan and South Korea. The
People’s Republic has also taken on a leading position
in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, an
intergovernmental organization whose membership
includes besides Russia and China various Central
Asian countries. Not least, as a permanent member of
the Security Council and a participant in various UN