World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

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118 6 Conflict constellations of poverty and because of a lack of other opportunities for earning a living – ultimately, therefore, he can be described as an economic refugee. The person who flees because ecological problems have triggered social disorder, as in Rwanda, is at the end of the day fleeing from war and violence. These people are therefore refugees of war. The term ‘environmental refugee’ is also criticized because it is misleading from a legal point of view. According to Art. 1A no. 2 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951 ( Geneva Refugee Convention, supplemented by the Protocol of 1967) ‘refugees’ are people who had to leave their country of residence because of ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’. These criteria do not apply to migration of which the primary causes are environmental; those affected by environmentally induced migration are therefore not protected by the guarantees accorded to refugees in international law. Both the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) have therefore spoken out against the use of the term ‘environmental refugees’. The preferred phrase is ‘environmentally displaced persons’, defined as ‘persons who are displaced within their own country of habitual residence or who have crossed an international border and for whom environmental degradation, deterioration or destruction is a major cause of their displacement, although not necessarily the sole one’ (IOM, 1996; Keane, 2004). Taking account of the above-mentioned criticism and drawing on the definition of UNHCR and IOM, the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) uses the term ‘environmental migrant’, because the term ‘migrant’ has a much broader meaning than the legal term ‘refugee’ (Marugg, 1990; Jahn, 2000). The term ‘environmental migrant’ will be used here to describe anyone who migrates because environmental changes either (1) have such an unfavourable effect on living conditions that previously achieved income levels and standards of living can not be maintained or (2) destroy structures that are ne cessary for the maintenance of these levels and standards (Lonergan, 1998; Wenzel, 2002; Salehyan, 2005). Depending on the type of environmental change and the courses of action open to those affected, a distinction can also be made between planned environmentally induced migration in the face of gradual environmental degradation and sudden environmentally induced migration as a response to extremes of weather. The distinction is, however, not a rigid one (Hugo, 1996; Clark, 2006). Current estimates of environmentally induced migration and forecasts of the future situation Figures for the number of environmental migrants worldwide vary depending on the definition and source data used. For example, Myers (1993, 2002) arrived at a figure for the middle of the 1990s of at least 25 million environmental migrants; he expects there to be 50 million by 2010 and up to 150 million by 2050. These figures have been frequently quoted – by, among others, the International Red Cross (IFRC, 1999), the IPCC (2001) and the United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS, 2005). In the literature, however, they have been harshly criticized for being inconsistent and impossible to check and, above all, for failing to take account of opportunities for adapting to the effects of climate change. Protecting coasts by dykes, for example, reduces the number of coastal dwellers who are forced to migrate because of floods caused by the rise in sea level and thus reduces the number of environmental migrants (McGregor, 1993; Kibreab, 1994; Black, 2001). Nuscheler concludes that it cannot be known how high the number of environmental migrants currently is (Nuscheler, 2004). Stern, however, stresses that within the context of current climate models Myers’ estimates can be regarded as plausible (Stern, 2006). The structure of environmentally induced migration can be described with greater certainty. It is thought likely that most such migration currently takes place within national borders and that this will continue to be the case in future. Environmental migrants are therefore more likely to be internally displaced persons rather than migrants who cross national borders. Most cross-border environmentally induced migration will probably take the form of south-south migration; no trend towards large southnorth migrations has been identified (UNPD, 2002; Nuscheler, 2004; Clark, 2006; UNFPA, 2006). It is also thought likely that gradual environmental degradation will cause significantly more people to migrate than weather extremes. The link between gradual soil degradation and migration is already recognized in the Desertification Convention (UNCCD) (Prologue and esp. Art. 17 Section 1 (e) UNCCD; UNCCD, 1994). Despite many uncertainties about the delimitation of the definition of environmentally induced migration and its measurement, one fact remains certain in the face of the expected effects of anthropogenically induced climate change: the part played by environmental degradation and weather extremes as causes of migration will increase (Lonergan, 1998; Biermann, 2001; Nuscheler, 2004; Salehyan, 2005; Stern, 2006; IPCC, 2007a).
Figure 6.5-1 Conflict constellation: ‘Environmentally induced migration’: Key factors and interactions Source: WBGU Phase 1: Environmentally–induced migration Individual attributes – Educational level – Migration history Conflict constellation: ‘Environmentally induced migration’ 6.5 1 Functioning institutions / governance structures – Disaster early warning systems – Land-use technologies – Water management systems 3 Phase 2: Migration–induced conflict Competition for resources / demographics – Land – Work – Basic social services 5 Diaspora / migration networks – Size and intensity of the diaspora – Political agenda – Financial strength 7 Governance capacity – Capacity and performance of government institutions Gradual environmental degradation or weather extremes in Region A 9 Migration from Region A to B Destabilization and conflict in Region A and/or B Violence Vulnerability – Per-capita income – Population growth 2 Environmentally induced conflicts – Climate-related decline in freshwater resources – Climate-related decline in food production – Climate-related increase in storm and flood disasters 4 Ethnicity – Change in ethnic balance – Social exclusion Perpetuation of the conflict constellation in other regions Boxes 1–10: Dimensions of influence with key factors Central causal chain 6 Reaction of destination country – Granting of access and usage rights – Non-discriminatory regulations – Minority rights 8 Political stability – Regime type (young democracy, autocracy etc.) – Conflict history 10 Influence of key factors on the central causal chain 119
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Climate Change as a Security Risk G
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Members of the German Advisory Coun
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German Advisory Council on Global C
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VI Council Staff and Acknowledgment
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VIII Contents 3.3.2 Economic factor
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X Contents 6.5.4.1 Avoiding environ
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XII Contents 10.3.2 Climate policy
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Tables Table 2.2-1 Main differences
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XVI Figures Figure 8.1-2 Climate st
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XVIII Acronyms and Abbreviations FI
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A new security policy challenge Sum
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ilization, the collapse of social s
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Six threats to international stabil
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Fostering a cooperative setting for
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firmed by the European Council, a b
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Initiative 8: Managing migration th
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which are not should satisfy the
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16 1 Introduction the present state
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Broadening the concept of security
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Messner, 2004; Klingebiel and Roehd
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Box 2.2-1 Worldwatch Institute: Cha
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26 3 Known conflict impacts of envi
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42 4 Rising conflict risks due to s
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56 5 Impacts of climate change on t
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168 8 Climate change as a driver of
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178 9 Research recommendations Tipp
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180 9 Research recommendations toge
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182 9 Research recommendations 2020
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184 9 Research recommendations ture
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186 9 Research recommendations wate
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188 9 Research recommendations tion
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190 10 Recommendations for action t
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192 10 Recommendations for action b
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194 10 Recommendations for action f
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196 10 Recommendations for action a
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198 10 Recommendations for action d
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200 10 Recommendations for action A
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204 10 Recommendations for action s
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206 10 Recommendations for action G
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208 10 Recommendations for action 1
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212 10 Recommendations for action n
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Abel, W (1974) Massenarmut und Hung
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BMU (Bundesministerium für Umwelt,
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36. University Amsterdam, Faculteit
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for Action. Global Commission on In
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library.fes.de/pdf-fi les/stabsabte
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- a review’. In Kreimer, A, Arnol
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ics in the Southern Brazilian Amazo
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No. 113. UNHCR Evaluation and Polic
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Stockle, C O, Dyke, P T, Williams,
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WBGU (German Advisory Council on Gl
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Action Plan ‘Crisis Prevention’
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er countries in 2001 at the 4th Min
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focuses on the security needs of hu
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towards the future as plausible ‘
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Index A Aceh 107 Africa 70-71, 72,
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Framework Convention on Climate Cha
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208, 211 security strategies 19, 21
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World in Transition: Climate Change as a Security Risk - WBGU

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