historical perspectives: from the hasmoneans to bar kokhba in light ...

"[T]HE[Y] DID NOT READ IN THE SEALED BOOK" 119
Qumran, CD 5:7-11 (prohibition of marrying one's niece) is, in
fact, a simple straightforward argument derived from the general linguistic
sense of the biblical law:
("the precept of incest is written from the point of view of
males, but the same applies to women"). 45 How far this is from tannaitic
midrash, as we know it, throughout the rabbinic literature! 46
45 See Rosenthal, 453 n. 15. Cf. Herr, "Continuum," 53-54; Herr,
"Who Were the Baethusians?," in Proceedings of the Seventh World Congress of Jewish
Studies: Studies in the Talmud, Halacha and Midrash (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish
Studies, 1981), 19.
46 See also Qimron and Strugnell, DJD 10.133: "This attitude of the sect can
also be seen in the halakhot themselves, with the rigid and consistent interpretations
given in them to terms from the Torah, as compared to the more fluid and
more innovative rabbinic interpretations of these same terms." This is not merely
incidental, for if one adheres to the plain, literal meaning of a text, surely there is
no need to justify the conclusions drawn from it, which, it might be argued, are
not, in a sense, 'conclusions' at all. Only when deviating from the plain, literal
meaning of the biblical text does one need to explicate the method by which the
conclusion was drawn, in order to justify it. This is halakhic midrash. (I am indebted
to Dror Yinon for this often overlooked insight.) For that reason, it would be appropriate
to avoid, as much as possible, using the term 'midrash' with respect to
Qumran halakhic material. Since, however, there is a certain ambiguity with the
use of the term 'midrash' in this context, it seems to me that a terminological
clarification is appropriate here.
Kister is undoubtedly correct, that "it is impossible to go back to the Torah without
some sort of biblical exegesis" ("Some Aspects of Qumranic Halakhah," 573),
and that "often . . . the sectarian law appears to derive from an interpretation of
Scripture" (Kister, "A Common Heritage," 105). This does not necessarily imply,
however, that any such interpretation and exegesis should be designated 'midrash';
the terms are not identical. It is true that if one takes 'midrash' to apply to any
reading of the biblical text (and thus to any kind of exegesis) and if one allows for
speculations regarding the methods by which the sect might have deduced from
Scripture its halakhic norms (this path was followed, most notably, by L. H. Schiffinan,
in his Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls [Chico: Scholars Press, 1983]), then the
use of the term 'midrash' might seem adequate.
If, however, we view such speculations as problematic (see the important critical
review of Schiffman's book by C. Milikowsky, "Law at Qumran: A Critical Reaction
to Lawrence H. Schiffinan, Sectarian Law in the Dead Sea Scrolls: Courts, Testimony, and
the Penal Code" RevQ 12 [1986]: 237-49; Fraade, "Midrash at Qumran," 62; A. I.
Baumgarten's review of the Hebrew edition of Schiffman's book in Zion 58 [1993]:
510 n. 7 [Hebrew]), and if by the term 'midrash' we refer to a specific and unique
method of reading (which, as we know from rabbinic literature, is quite complicated),
then 'midrash' can hardly be found in Qumran halakhic literature. This fact
was admitted, after all, by Schiffinan himself (see the references in n. 44 above and
Rosenthal, ).
For similar reasons I would avoid using this term when describing attempts, by
the authors of later books of the Hebrew Bible, to interpret pentateuchal commandments
or to reconcile contradictory verses in the Torah. See Fishbane, Biblical
Interpretation, 134-37; I. L. Seeligmann, "The Beginnings of Midrash in the Book of
Chronicles," Tarbiz 49 (1980): 14-32 (= Studies in Biblical Literature [Jerusalem: Magnes