Chronologische - Ethikseite

2010 [88] Hernandez, Jill Graper (2010): Impermissibility and Kantian Moral Worth, Ethical Theory and
Moral Practice 13, S. 403–19. 30
2010 [89] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2010): Kant’s Tugendlehre as Normative Ethics, in Kant’s Metaphysics
of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 234–55.
2010 [90] Hoche, Hans-Ulrich/Knoop, Michael (2010): Logical Relations Between Kant’s Categorical
Imperative and the Two Golden Rules, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 18, S. 483–518.
2010 [91] Höffe, Otfried (2010): Kant’s Innate Right as a Rational Criterion for Human Rights, in Kant’s
Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 71–92.
2010 [92] Johnson, Robert N. (2010): Duties to and Regarding to Others, in Kant’s Metaphysics of
Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 192–209.
2010 [93] Kain, Patrick (2010): Duties Regarding Animals, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical
Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis, Cambridge, S. 210–33.
2010 [94] Kain, Patrick (2010): Practical Cognition, Intuition, and the Fact of Reason, in Kant’s Moral
Metaphysics. God, Freedom, and Immortality, hrsg. von Benjamin J. Bruxvoort
Lipscomb und James Krueger, Berlin, S. 211–30.
2010 [95] Keller, Pierre (2010): Two Conceptions of Compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation, in Kant’s
Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens
Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 119–45.
2010 [96] Kleingeld, Pauline (2010): Moral Consciousness and the ‘Fact of Reason’, in Kant’s Critique
of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens
Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 55–72.
2010 [97] Klemme, Heiner F. (2010): The Origin and Aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, in
Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und
Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 11–30.
2010 [98] Kuehn, Manfred (2010): Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals: The History and Significance of Its
Deferral, in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Lara Denis,
Cambridge, S. 9–27.
2010 [99] Lipscomb, Benjamin J. Bruxvoort/Krueger, James (Hrsg.) (2010): Kant’s Moral Metaphysics.
God, Freedom, and Immortality, Berlin.
have to prepare for virtuous conduct that are different from simply fulfilling specific duties of virtue, and
that in so doing he describes an important element of the moral life.”
30 “Samuel Kerstein argues that an asymmetry between moral worth and maxims prevents Kant from
accepting a category of acts that are impermissible, but have moral worth. Kerstein contends that an act
performed from the motive of duty should be considered as a candidate for moral worth, even if the action’s
maxim turns out to be impermissible, since moral worth depends on the correct moral motivation of an act,
rather than on the moral rightness of an act. I argue that Kant cannot consistently maintain that there are
morally forbidden, though good, acts since one of the conditions of acting from the moral law should be that
one has a true belief about what the moral law requires. My project, then, rejects the possibility of morally
impermissible, worthy acts for Kant, and qualifies the conditions for moral worth Kerstein gives with an
epistemological constraint on moral worth.”