Chronologische - Ethikseite

2008 [219] Morrisson, Iain P. D. (2008): Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action, Athens, OH. 58
2008 [220] Moyar, Dean (2008): Practical Apperception: Self-Imputation and Moral Judgment, in Recht
und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses,
Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de
Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 281–90.
2008 [221] Moyar, Dean (2008): Unstable Autonomy: Conscience and Judgment in Kant’s Moral
Philosophy, Journal of Moral Philosophy 5, S. 327–60. 59
2008 [222] Muchnik, Pablo (2008): Kant on the Sources of Evil, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie
Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg.
von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R. Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing,
Berlin, S. 291–301.
2008 [223] Nahra, Cinara (2008): Acting from the Motive of Duty and the Incorruptible Ideal Moral
Agent, in Recht und Frieden in der Philosophie Kants. Akten des X. Internationalen
Kant-Kongresses, Band 3: Sektionen III–IV, hrsg. von Valerio Rohden, Ricarda R.
Terra, Guido A. de Almeida und Margit Ruffing, Berlin, S. 303–11.
2008 [224] Nelson, William (2008): Kant’s Formula of Humanity, Mind 117, S. 85–106. 60
duty superior to acting from love and sympathetic feelings, but the cold-heartedness found in Kant’s
examples should be thought of as a virtue rather than a vice.”
58 “Kant scholars since the early nineteenth century have disa­greed about how to interpret his theory of moral
motivation. Kant tells us that the feeling of respect is the incentive to moral action, but he is notoriously
ambiguous on the question of what exactly this means. In Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action,
Iain Morrisson offers a new view on Kant’s theory of moral action.
In a clear, straightforward style, Morrisson responds to the ongoing interpretive stalemate by taking an
original approach to the problem. Whereas previous commentators have attempted to understand Kant’s
feeling of respect by studying the relevant textual evidence in isolation, Morrisson illuminates this evidence
by determining what Kant’s more general theory of action commits him to regarding moral action. After
looking at how Kant’s treatment of desire and feeling can be reconciled with his famous account of free
maxim-based action, Morrisson argues that respect moves us to moral action in a way that is structurally
parallel to the way in which nonmoral pleasure motivates nonmoral action.
In reconstructing a unified theory of action in Kant, Morrisson integrates a number of distinct elements in
his practical philosophy. Kant and the Role of Pleasure in Moral Action is part of a new wave of interest in
Kant’s anthropological (that is, psychological) works.” (Publisher’s (Ohio University Press) description)
59 “In this paper I argue that Kant’s claims about conscience in his moral writings of the 1790s reveal a
fundamental instability in his moral philosophy. The central issue is the relationship between the moral law
as the form of universality and the judgment of individuals about specific cases. Against Thomas Hill’s
claim that Kant has only a limited role for conscience, I argue that conscience has a comprehensive role in
Kantian deliberation. I unpack the claims about conscience in the Metaphysics of Morals to show that they
describe conscience as both a basic act of self-consciousness and as an all-things-considered judgment. I
outline the role of conscience in moral motivation, and argue that taken together Kant’s writings about
conscience reveal a way to rethink Kant’s conception of the Fact of Reason.”
60 “This paper is concerned with the normative content of Kant’s formula of humanity (FH). More specifically,
does FH, as some seem to think, imply the specific and rigid prescriptions in ‘standard’ deontological
theories? To this latter question, I argue, the answer is ‘no’. I propose reading FH largely through the