Chronologische - Ethikseite

2004 [443] Horn, Christoph (2004): Die Menschheit als objektiver Zweck – Kants Selbstzweckformel des
kategorischen Imperativs, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma,
Paderborn 2004, S. 195–212.
2004 [444] Howard, Jason J. (2004): Kant and Moral Imputation: Conscience and the Riddle of the Given,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78, S. 609–29.
2004 [445] Hruschka, Joachim (2004): Auf dem Wege zum Kategorischen Imperativ, in Metaphysik und
Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65. Geburtstag, hrsg. von Sabine Doyé,
Marion Heinz und Udo Rameil, Berlin, New York, S. 167–81.
2004 [446] Hruschka, Joachim (2004): The Permissive Law of Practical Reason in Kant’s Metaphysics of
Morals, Law and Philosophy 23, S. 45–72.
2004 [447] Johnson, Robert N. (2004): Kant’s Moral Philosophy, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
hrsg. von Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-moral/.
2004 [448] Kain, Patrick (2004): Self-Legislation in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Archiv für Geschichte der
Philosophie 86, S. 257–306. 123
2004 [449] Kersting, Wolfgang (2004): Vernunft, Verbindlichkeit und Recht bei Kant, in Kants Ethik,
hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn, S. 269–90.
2004 [450] Kim, Jong-Gook (2004): Kants Lügenverbot in sozialethischer Perspektive, Kant-Studien 95,
S. 226–34.
2004 [451] Kitcher, Patricia (2004): Kant’s Argument for the Categorical Imperative, Nous 38, S. 555–84.
2004 [452] Klimchuk, Dennis (2004): Three Accounts of Respect for Persons in Kant’s Ethics, Kantian
Review 8, S. 38–61.
2004 [453] Krasnoff, Larry (2004): Pythagoras Enlightened: Kant on the Effect of Moral Philosophy,
in New Essays on the History of Autonomy. A Collection Honoring J. B. Schneewind,
hrsg. von Natalie Brender und Larry Krasnoff, Cambridge, S. 133–53.
2004 [454] Kulenkampff, Jens (2004): Moralisches Gefühl oder moral sense: wie berechtigt ist Kants Kritik?,
Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, Band 12, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim
Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 233–51.
2004 [455] Oberer, Hariolf (2004): Honeste vive. Zu Immanuel Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, AA 06,
236. 20–30, in Metaphysik und Kritik. Festschrift für Manfred Baum zum 65.
123 “Kant famously insisted that “the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will” is
the supreme principle of morality. Recent interpreters have taken this emphasis on the self-legislation of the
moral law as evidence that Kant endorsed a distinctively constructivist conception of morality according to
which the moral law is a positive law, created by us. But a closer historical examination suggests otherwise.
Kant developed his conception of legislation in the context of his opposition to theological voluntarist
accounts of morality and his engagement with conceptions of obligation found in his Wolffian predecessors.
In order to defend important claims about the necessity and immediacy of moral obligation, Kant drew and
refined a distinction between the legislation and authorship of the moral law in a way that precludes
standard theological voluntarist theories and presents an obstacle to recent constructivist interpretations. A
correct understanding of Kant’s development and use of this distinction reveals that his conception of
legislation leaves little room for constructivist moral anti-realism.”