Chronologische - Ethikseite

2010 [108] Rehbock, Theda (2010): Moral und Sprache. Ist das Verbot der Lüge sprachphilosophisch
begründbar?, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 58, S. 105–25. 35
2010 [109] Roff, Heather M. (2010): Kantian Provisional Duties, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 18, S. 533-
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2010 [110] Schönecker, Dieter E. (2010): Kant über Menschenliebe als moralische Grundlage, Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 92, S. 133–75. 36
2010 [111] Schwartz, Jeremy (2010): Do Hypothetical Imperatives Require Categorical Imperatives?,
European Journal of Philosophy 18, S. 84–107. 37
34 Preface vii. List of contributors viii. Translations and abbreviations x. Introduction – Andrews Reath 1. The
origin and aim of Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason – Heiner F. Klemme 11. Formal principles and the
form of a law – Andrews Reath 31. Moral consciousness and the ‘fact of reason’ – Pauline Kleingeld 55.
Reversal or retreat? Kant’s deductions of freedom and morality – Jens Timmermann 73. The Triebfeder of
pure practical reason – Stephen Engstrom 90. Two conceptions of compatibilism in the Critical Elucidation
– Pierre Keller 119. The Antinomy of Practical Reason: reason, the unconditioned and the highest good –
Eric Watkins 145. The primacy of practical reason and the idea of a practical postulate – Marcus
Willaschek 168. The meaning of the Critique of Practical Reason for moral beings: the Doctrine of Method
of Pure Practical Reason – Stefano Bacin 197. Bibliography 216. Index 223.
35 “The paper tries to defend the Augustinian and Kantian position on the moral problem of lying against the
popular opinion that this position must be rejected as an inhuman rigorism. The first part argues that
Augustine and Kant do not intend to condemn entirely any kind of lying in any single case, which would be
the task of (the power of) judgment (Urteilskraft). Rather, they strive for a clarification of lying as a
fundamental moral concept of language. Those concepts are not morally neutral, as consequentialist
positions hold, but function rather as a kind of conceptual measure or compass for moral judgment. That
means that single lies can be excusable or an inevitable evil. But under no circumstance do we have a right
or even an obligation to lie. The second part shows how the moral prohibition against lying as a linguistic
act can be argued for - as Augustine and Kant do - by reflection on the anthropological meaning of language
for human existence. For this purpose, following the phenomenological tradition three meanings of
language are distinguished: 1. language as object, 2. language as practice, 3. language as “Sinnhorizont”
(conceptual structured horizon of sense).”
36 “In the Introduction of the Tugendlehre, Kant identifies love of human beings as one of the four moral
predispositions that make us receptive to the moral law. We claim that this love is neither benevolence nor
the aptitude of the inclination to beneficence in general (both are also called love of human beings); rather it
is amor complacentiae, which Kant understands as the delight in moral striving for perfection. We also
provide a detailed analysis of Kant’s almost completely neglected theory of moral predispositions. They are
necessary conditions to be aware of the moral law and to be motivated by it.”
37 “Recently, the idea that every hypothetical imperative must somehow be ‘backed up’ by a prior categorical
imperative has gained a certain influence among Kant interpreters and ethicists influenced by Kant. Since
instrumentalism is the position that holds that hypothetical imperatives can by themselves and without the
aid of categorical imperatives explain all valid forms of practical reasoning, the influential idea amounts to
a rejection of instrumentalism as internally incoherent. This paper argues against this prevailing view both
as an interpretation of Kant and as philosophical understanding of practical reason. In particular, it will be
argued that many of the arguments that claim to show that hypothetical imperatives must be backed up by
categorical imperatives mistakenly assume that the form of practical reasoning must itself occur as a