Chronologische - Ethikseite

2005 [396] Calder, Todd (2005): Kant and Degrees of Wrongness, Journal of Value Inquiry 39, S. 229–
44.
2005 [397] Denis, Lara (2005): Autonomy and the Highest Good, Kantian Review 10, S. 33–59.
2005 [398] Forschner, Maximilian (2005): Immanuel Kant über Vernunftglaube und
Handlungsmotivation, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 59, S. 327–44.
2005 [399] Freydberg, Bernard (2005): Imagination in Kant’s Critique of Practial Reason, Bloomington.
2005 [400] Graband, Claudia (2005): Das Vermögen der Freiheit: Kants Kategorien der praktischen Vernunft,
Kant-Studien 96, S. 41–65.
2005 [401] Greenberg, Sean (2005): From Canon to Dialectic to Antinomy: Giving Inclinations Their
Due, Inquiry 48, S. 232–48. 114
2005 [402] Grenberg, Jeanine M. (2005): Kant and the Ethics of Humility. A Story of Dependence,
Corruption and Virtue, Cambridge. 115
2005 [403] Guyer, Paul (2005): Kant’s System of Duties, in Guyer, Kant’s System of Nature and Freedom.
Selected Essays, Oxford, S. 243–74.
2005 [404] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (2005): Assessing Moral Rules: Utilitarian and Kantian Perspectives,
Philosophical Issues 15, S. 158–178.
2005 [405] Hills, Alison (2005): Rational Nature as the Source of Value, Kantian Review 10, S. 60–81.
2005 [406] Joerden, Jan C. (2005): Über ein vermeintes Recht (des Staates) aus Menschenliebe zu foltern,
in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für
114 “In a recent paper, Eckart Förster challenges interpreters to explain why in the first Critique practical
reason has a canon but no dialectic, whereas in the second Critique, there is not only a dialectic, but an
antinomy of practical reason. In the Groundwork, Kant claims that there is a natural dialectic with respect
to morality (4:405), a different claim from those advanced in the first and second Critiques. Förster's
challenge may therefore be reformulated as the problem of explaining why practical reason has a canon in
the first Critique, a dialectic in the Groundwork, and an antinomy in the second Critique. In this paper, I
answer this challenge. I argue that these differences are due to the different aims and scope of the works,
and in particular, the different place of the inclinations in their arguments.”
115 “In recent years, philosophers have either ignored the virtue of humility or found it to be in need of radical
redefinition. But humility is a central human virtue, and it is the purpose of this book to defend that claim
from a Kantian point of view. Jeanine Grenberg argues that we can indeed speak of Aristotelian-style, but
still deeply Kantian, virtuous character traits. She proposes moving from focus on action to focus on person,
not leaving the former behind, but instead taking it up within a larger, more satisfying Kantian moral
theory. Using examples from literature as well as philosophy, she shows that there is a Kantian virtue theory
to be explored in which humility plays a central role. Her book will have a wide appeal to readers not only
in Kant studies but also in theological ethics and moral psychology.”
Contents: “Introduction; Part I. Kantian Virtue: 1. Dependent and corrupt rational agency; 2. Constraints on
any possible Kantian account of virtue; 3. A Kantian account of virtue; Part II. A Kantian Response to
Recent Accounts of Humility: 4. A Kantian response to recent accounts of humility; Part III: 5. The Kantian
Virtue of Humility: 5. The Kantian virtue of humility; 6. Humility and self-respect; 7. The humble person;
Part IV. The Virtues of Kantian Humility: 8. The humble pursuit of self-knowledge; 9. The humble pursuit
of respect for persons; Conclusion.”