Chronologische - Ethikseite

2007 [286] Papish, Laura (2007): The Cultivation of Sensibility in Kant’s Moral Philosophy, Kantian
Review 12, S. 128–46.
2007 [287] Peucker, Henning (2007): Husserl’s Critique of Kant’s Ethics, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 45, S. 309–19. 80
2007 [288] Pollok, Konstantin (2007): „Wenn Vernunft volle Gewalt über das Begehrungsvermögen
hätte“ – Über die gemeinsame Wurzel der Kantischen Imperative, Kant-Studien 98, S.
57–80.
2007 [289] Riley, Patrick (2007): Kant against Hobbes in Theory and Practice, Journal of Moral
Philosophy 4, S. 194–206. 81
2007 [290] Rödl, Sebastian (2007): Comments on Guyer, Inquiry 50, S. 489–96. 82 – Zu [271].
2007 [291] Sedgwick, Sally (2007): The Empty Formalism of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Hegel’s
Critique Revisited, Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 16, S. 5–17.
2007 [292] Seung, T. K. (2007): Kant: A Guide for the Perplexed, London, S. 90–143 (“2. Practical
80 “This paper introduces Husserl’s ethics by examining his critique of Kant’s ethics. It presents Husserl’s
lectures on ethics in which he offers his own ethical theory in a historical context. The phenomenological
ethics seeks to combine the advantages of both the traditional empiricism and rationalism. Husserl’s ethics
takes into account that emotions play an essential role in the constitution of values and morals.
Contrariwise, Husserl fights against relativism in ethics and praises Kant for the discovery of an absolute
moral imperative. He considers Kant’s ethics as a rationalistic position that is too formal and that does not
take into account that every will must be motivated by some concrete material good that is evaluated in our
feelings or emotions.”
81 “In the middle section of Theory and Practice, Kant speaks briefly ‘against Hobbes’; but for a fuller version
of Kant’s anti-Hobbesianism one must turn to the three Critiques, the Groundwork, and Religion within the
Limits of Reason Alone. It is in those works that one learns that, for Kant, Hobbes’s notion of ‘will’ as fully
determined ‘last appetite’ destroys the freedom needed to take ‘ought’ or moral necessity as the motives for
self-determined action; that Hobbes’s version of the social contract is thus incoherent; that Hobbes is not
even able to show how moral ideas (i.e. ‘ought’) are conceivable through the ‘pressure’ of ‘outward objects’.
For Kant, in short, Hobbes has no adequate notions of will, freedom, moral necessity, ideation, or even
obligatory contract, and therefore fails in his own stated aims.”
82 “Before and in the Groundwork, Kant argues as follows for the validity of the moral law: we want to be free.
Following the moral law is the only way to be free. So we should follow the moral law. The first premise of
this syllogism is treated differently before and in the Groundwork. First Kant thought it an empirical fact
that men want to be free and want it more than anything else. Later he sought an a priori argument showing
that we ought to want to be free and are right in thinking it good. The former justification of the moral law
is superior. When we look to “salvage the normative core of Kantian moral philosophy” (Guyer 445), we
should turn to it. – So far Paul Guyer.
It is evident that Guyer fails to describe Kant’s thought in the Groundwork. It is equally clear that Kant
never held the position Guyer claims he held before the Groundwork. (The quotations Guyer gives in
support of his claim show this.) Therefore I shall not discuss Guyer’s interpretation of Kant. Instead I shall
consider the philosophical merits of the position he ascribes to the pre-critical Kant, and which he
recommends as superior. We shall see that that position makes no sense. This indirectly addresses the
interpretive question, as it is a reason against ascribing it to Kant.”