Chronologische - Ethikseite

2007 [300] Timmermann, Jens (2007): Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary,
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2007 [301] Weber, Michael (2007): More on the Motive of Duty, Journal of Ethics 11, S. 65–86. 87
2007 [302] Wendel, Hans Jürgen (2007): Vernünftige Selbstbestimmung und gutes Leben, in Was ist und
was sein soll. Natur und Freiheit bei Immanuel Kant, hrsg. von Udo Kern, Berlin, S.
241–64.
2007 [303] Wood, Allen W. (2007): Comments on Guyer, Inquiry 50, S. 465–79. 88 – Zu [271].
2006 [304] Ameriks, Karl (2006): Kant and Motivational Externalism, in Moralische Motivation. Kant
und die Alternativen, hrsg. von Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn und Dieter
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2006 [305] Baron, Marcia (2006): Acting from Duty (GMS, 397–401), in Groundwork for the
Metaphysics of Morals, hrsg. von Christoph Horn und Dieter Schönecker, Berlin, S.
72–92.
2006 [306] Baron, Marcia (2006): Moral Paragons and the Metaphysics of Morals, in A Companion to
Kant, hrsg. von Graham Bird, Oxford, S. 335–49.
2006 [307] Baron, Marcia (2006): Overdetermined Actions and Imperfect Duties, in Moralische
The paper also discusses Kant’s attempts to clarify his moral psychology, philosophy of value and
conception of the highest good in the course of replying to Garve’s challenge.”
87 “A number of neo-Kantians have suggested that an act may be morally worthy even if sympathy and similar
emotions are present, so long as they are not what in fact motivates right action-so long as duty, and duty
alone, in fact motivates. Thus, the ideal Kantian moral agent need not be a cold and unfeeling person, as
some critics have suggested. Two objections to this view need to be answered. First, some maintain that
motives cannot be present without in fact motivating. Such non-motivating reasons, it is claimed, are
incoherent. Second, if such motives are not in fact motivating, then nonetheless the moral agent’s
performance of right action will be objectionably cold and unfeeling. While the first objection is not
compelling, since the alternative according to which all motives in fact motivate but differ in strength
suffers from the very same problems attributed to the neo-Kantian view, the second has force, and any
account of moral worth must make room for motives such as sympathy actually motivating right action.”
88 “Paul Guyer’s paper “Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant’s Moral Philosophy” raises a set of
issues about how Kantian ethics should be understood in relation to present day “philosophical naturalism”
that are very much in need of discussion. The paper itself is challenging, even in some respects iconoclastic,
and provides a highly welcome provocation to raise in new ways some basic questions about what Kantian
ethics is and what it ought to be. Guyer offers us an admirably informed and complex argument, both
historical and philosophical, that tangles with some of the most difficult problems in Kant’s moral
philosophy. It begins with some ambitious and controversial claims about Kant’s moral philosophy prior to
the Groundwork of 1785. It then offers an interpretation, and also a fundamental criticism, of the
Groundwork’s attempt to establish the moral law based on the idea of freedom of the will. And finally, it
raises – and expresses some opinions on – the large and vexed questions of the relationship between
transcendental philosophy and philosophical naturalism, and whether Kantian ethics can be made
consistent with a naturalistic philosophical outlook. In these comments I will have something to say on each
of these three topics, without pretending (any more than Guyer does) to have exhausted what might be said
about them.”