Chronologische - Ethikseite

2005 [419] Sussman, David (2005): Perversity of the Heart, Philosophical Review 114, S. 153–77. [Über
das radikale Böse, on radical evil.]
2005 [420] Taylor, Robert S. (2005): Kantian Personal Autonomy, Political Theory 33, S. 602–28. 118
2005 [421] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Good but Not Required? – Assessing the Demands of Kantian
Ethics, Journal of Moral Philosophy 2, S. 9–27. 119
2005 [422] Timmermann, Jens (2005): When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty
in Kantian Ethics, Kantian Review 10, S. 128–49.
2005 [423] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian, Utilitas 17, S. 243–
64. 120
118 “Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative
self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility
that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the
elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue” –
specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is
important for at least three reasons: first, it elucidates the relationship among the various conceptions of
autonomy employed by personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians; second, it brings to the
surface previously unnoticed or undernoticed features of Kant’s moral theory; and third, it provides an
essential line of defense against certain critiques of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John
Rawls.”
119 “There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally
valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an
ethical system firmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary
acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classification of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited,
which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of
uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-flown emotional nonsense.
Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not
required must be re-classified as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably
demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature
of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant’s writings presenting
strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill’s
suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions
classified as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that, contra Hill, there are no actions of
wide duty that can be so characterized in any significant sense; and (3) a final discussion of the problem of
how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.”
120 “In 1993, Richard Hare argued that, contrary to received opinion, Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this
article, I argue that Hare was wrong. Kant's theory would not have been utilitarian or consequentialist even
if his practical recommendations coincided with utilitarian commands: Kant's theory of value is essentially
anti-utilitarian; there is no place for rational contradiction as the source of moral imperatives in
utilitarianism; Kant would reject the move to separate levels of moral thinking: first-order moral judgement
makes use of the principle of morality; and, relatedly, he would resist the common utilitarian distinction
between actions and their motives because any correct description of an action must refer to motivation. The
article concludes with the thought that any consequentialist theory based on pre-given ends (teleology) lacks