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2005 [419] Sussman, David (2005): Perversity of the Heart, Philosophical Review 114, S. 153–77. [Über das radikale Böse, on radical evil.] 2005 [420] Taylor, Robert S. (2005): Kantian Personal Autonomy, Political Theory 33, S. 602–28. 118 2005 [421] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Good but Not Required? – Assessing the Demands of Kantian Ethics, Journal of Moral Philosophy 2, S. 9–27. 119 2005 [422] Timmermann, Jens (2005): When the Tail Wags the Dog: Animal Welfare and Indirect Duty in Kantian Ethics, Kantian Review 10, S. 128–49. 2005 [423] Timmermann, Jens (2005): Why Kant Could not Have Been a Utilitarian, Utilitas 17, S. 243– 64. 120 118 “Jeremy Waldron has recently raised the question of whether there is anything approximating the creative self-authorship of personal autonomy in the writings of Immanuel Kant. After considering the possibility that Kantian prudential reasoning might serve as a conception of personal autonomy, I argue that the elements of a more suitable conception can be found in Kant’s Tugendlehre, or “Doctrine of Virtue” – specifically, in the imperfect duties of self-perfection and the practical love of others. This discovery is important for at least three reasons: first, it elucidates the relationship among the various conceptions of autonomy employed by personal-autonomy theorists and contemporary Kantians; second, it brings to the surface previously unnoticed or undernoticed features of Kant’s moral theory; and third, it provides an essential line of defense against certain critiques of contemporary Kantian theories, especially that of John Rawls.” 119 “There seems to be a strong sentiment in pre-philosophical moral thought that actions can be morally valuable without at the same time being morally required. Yet Kant, who takes great pride in developing an ethical system firmly grounded in common moral thought, makes no provision for any such extraordinary acts of virtue. Rather, he supports a classification of actions as either obligatory, permissible or prohibited, which in the eyes of his critics makes it totally inadequate to the facts of morality. The related idea of uncommonly grand and noble deeds is frequently dismissed by Kant as high-flown emotional nonsense. Such considerations give rise to the fear that actions intuitively classed as morally commendable but not required must be re-classified as commands of duty by Kant, making his ethical theory as unbearably demanding as direct utilitarianism. The paper divides into three sections: (1) an examination of the nature of moral goodness from a meta-ethical angle that introduces some passages from Kant’s writings presenting strong theoretical evidence against the case for supererogatory action; (2) a critique of Thomas Hill’s suggestion that within the category of wide duty we can accommodate some of the main features of actions classified as supererogatory in other ethical systems; concluding that, contra Hill, there are no actions of wide duty that can be so characterized in any significant sense; and (3) a final discussion of the problem of how demanding the requirements of Kantian ethical theory really are.” 120 “In 1993, Richard Hare argued that, contrary to received opinion, Kant could have been a utilitarian. In this article, I argue that Hare was wrong. Kant's theory would not have been utilitarian or consequentialist even if his practical recommendations coincided with utilitarian commands: Kant's theory of value is essentially anti-utilitarian; there is no place for rational contradiction as the source of moral imperatives in utilitarianism; Kant would reject the move to separate levels of moral thinking: first-order moral judgement makes use of the principle of morality; and, relatedly, he would resist the common utilitarian distinction between actions and their motives because any correct description of an action must refer to motivation. The article concludes with the thought that any consequentialist theory based on pre-given ends (teleology) lacks
2005 [424] Timmons, Mark (2005): The Philosophical and Practical Significance of Kant’s Universality Formulations of the Categorical Imperative, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 313–33. 2005 [425] Uniacke, Suzanne (2005): Responsibility and Obligation: Some Kantian Directions, International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13, S. 461–75. 121 2005 [426] Westphal, Kenneth R. (2005): Kant, Hegel, and Determining Our Duties, in Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 13: Philosophia Practica Universalis. Festschrift für Joachim Hruschka zum 70. Geburtstag, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 335–54. 2005 [427] Wood, Allen W. (2005): Kant, Oxford [Erschienen 2004], S. 129–50 (“Ethical Theory”). 2004 [428] Ameriks, Karl (2004): Kant und das Problem der moralischen Motivation, in Kants Ethik, hrsg. von Karl Ameriks und Dieter Sturma, Paderborn 2004, S. 98–116. 2004 [429] Ameriks, Karl/Sturma, Dieter (Hrsg.) (2004): Kants Ethik, Paderborn. 2004 [430] Bartuschat, Wolfgang (2004): Kant über Grundsatz und Grundsätze in der Moral, Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik, Band 12, hrsg. von B. Sharon Byrd, Joachim Hruschka und Jan C. Joerden, Berlin, S. 283–98. 2004 [431] Biller-Andorno, Nikola (2004): Die Kantische Moraltheorie im Kontext der modernen Medizinethik, in Angewandte Ethik im Spannungsfeld von Begründung und Anwendung, hrsg. von Hans Friesen und Karsten Berr, Frankfurt a. M., S. 295–308. 2004 [432] Coeckelbergh, Mark (2004): The Metaphysics of Autonomy. The Reconciliation of Ancient and Modern Ideals of the Person, Houndmills, S. 147–68 (“Hill’s Ideal of Autonomy”), S. the philosophical resources to distinguish between willing something as a means and as an end, leaving means only, and destroying transparency.” 121 “This paper asks how we should conceptualize the relationship between responsibility and obligation. Its central concern is the relevance of considerations of obligation to the attribution of responsibility for what we do or bring about. The paper approaches this issue through an examination of Kant’s complex, challenging and instructive theory of responsibility, in which strict obligation plays a pivotal role in attributions of responsibility for the outcomes of our actions. Even if we do not accept Kant’s strongly juridical concept of responsibility, his theory provides insight into the way in which we should see the connection between responsibility and obligation.”
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