Chronologische - Ethikseite

2011 [41] Grenberg, Jeanine (2011): Making Sense of the Relationship of Reason and Sensibility in
Kant’s Ethics, Kantian Review 28, S. 461–72. 16 – Zu [70].
2011 [42] Guyer, Paul (2011): Kantian Perfectionism, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian
Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth, Cambridge, S.
194–214.
2011 [43] Herman, Barbara (2011): A Mismatch of Methods, in Derek Parfit, On What Matters Volume
2, Oxford, S. 83–115.
2011 [44] Herman, Barbara (2011): The Difference that Ends Make, in Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on
Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics, hrsg. von Lawrence Jost und Julian Wuerth,
Cambridge, S. 92–115.
2011 [45] Jost, Lawrence/Wuerth, Julian (Hrsg.) (2011): Perfecting Virtue. New Essays on Kantian
Ethics and Virtue Ethics, Cambridge.
2011 [46] Kontos, Pavlos (2011): Kant’s Categories of Freedom as Rules of Moral Salience, Zeitschrift
für philosophische Forschung 65, S. 218–40. 17
2011 [47] Mikkola, Mari (2011): Kant on Moral Agency and Women’s Nature, Kantian Review 16, S.
89–111. 18
2011 [48] Onof, Christian (2011): Moral Worth and Inclinations in Kantian Ethics, Kant Studies Online
(April 2011), S. 1–46, http://www.kantstudiesonline.net.
2011 [49] Parfit, Derek (2011): On What Matters Volume 1, Oxford, S. 177–342 (8. Possible Consent. 9.
Merely as a Means. 10. Respect and Value. 11. Free Will and Desert. 12. Universal
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, however, are said to support only a weaker requirement, namely,
that a maxim conform to a universal law. Hence, Kant omits at least one necessary substantive premise of
the derivation. This paper attempts to show that nothing substantive is omitted from the argument. It only
needs two principles of inference that it is assumed add nothing substantive to the premises.”
16 “In this essay, I look at some claims Anne Margaret Baxley makes, in her recent book Kant’s Theory of
Virtue: The Value of Autocracy, about the relationship between reason and sensibility in Kant’s theory of
virtue. I then reflect on tensions I find in these claims as compared to the overall goal of her book: an
account of Kant’s conception of virtue as autocracy. Ultimately, I argue that interpreters like Baxley (and
myself) who want to welcome a more robust role for feeling in Kantian ethics must, in order to achieve our
purposes, move beyond the general account of the limits for the role of the moral feeling of respect in the
grounding of Kant’s ethics which Henry Allison established in his influential Kant’s Theory of Freedom.”
17 “This paper attempts to bring to light and to justify the double task that Kant confers on the categories of
freedom. It will be maintained that the categories of freedom do not only function as the ratio cognoscendi
of free actions within the sensible world but they are also well appropriated to ground the concepts of the
good and the evil as genuine rules of moral salience (according to Herman’s well-known label), that is to
say, as rules of how to detect and appraise circumstances and deeds bestowed with moral significance.”
18 “Some commentators have condemned Kant’s moral project from a feminist perspective based on Kant’s
apparently dim view of women as being innately morally deficient. Here I will argue that although his
remarks concerning women are unsettling at first glance, a more detailed and closer examination shows that
Kant’s view of women is actually far more complex and less unsettling than that attributed to him by
various feminist critics. My argument, then, undercuts the justification for the severe feminist critique of
Kant’s moral project.”