Chronologische - Ethikseite

2010 [100] Lipscomb, Benjamin (2010): Moral Imperfection and Moral Phenomenology in Kant, in
Kant’s Moral Metaphysics. God, Freedom, and Immortality, hrsg. von
Benjamin J. Bruxvoort Lipscomb und James Krueger, Berlin, S. 49–80.
2010 [101] McCarty, Richard (2010): Kant’s Derivation of the Formula of Universal Law, Dialogue 49, S.
113–33. 31
2010 [102] Ostaric, Lara (2010): Works of Genius as Sensible Exhibitions of the Idea of the Highest Good,
Kant-Studien 101, 22–39. 32
2010 [103] Pallikkathayil, Japa (2010): Deriving Morality from Politics: Rethinking the Formula of
Humanity, Ethics 121, S. 116–47. 33
2010 [104] Palmquist, Stephen (2010): Kant’s Ethics of Grace: Perspectival Solutions to the Moral Difficulties
with Divine Assistance, Journal of Religion 90, S. 530–53.
2010 [105] Reath, Andrews (2010): Introduction, in Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A Critical Guide,
hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 1–10.
2010 [106] Reath, Andrews (2010): Formal Principles and the Form of a Law, in Kant’s Critique of
Practical Reason. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Andrews Reath und Jens Timmermann,
Cambridge, S. 31–54.
2010 [107] Reath, Andrews/Timmermann, Jens (Hrsg.) (2010): Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason. A
Critical Guide, Cambridge. 34
31 “Critics have charged that there are gaps in the logic of Kant’s derivation of the formula of universal law.
Here I defend that derivation against these charges, partly by emphasizing a neglected teleological principle
that Kant alluded to in his argument, and partly by clarifying what he meant by actions’ “conformity to
universal law.” He meant that actions conform to universal law just when their maxims can belong to a
unified system of principles. An analogy with objects’ conformity to universal law in nature helps show how
Kant was correct in deriving the formula of universal law from the premises of his argument.”
32 “In this paper I argue that, on Kant's view, the work of genius serves as a sensible exhibition of the Idea of
the highest good. In other words, the work of genius serves as a special sign that the world is hospitable to
our moral ends and that the realization of our moral vocation in such a world may indeed be possible. In the
first part of the paper, I demonstrate that the purpose of the highest good is not to strengthen our motivation
to accept the moral law as binding for us but, rather, to strengthen our motivation to persist in our already
existent moral dispositions. In the second part, I show that the works of genius exhibit the Idea of the
highest good and, consequently, strengthen our hope in its realization. Drawing on the results of the second
part, the third part of the paper demonstrates that beauty, of both art and nature, symbolizes morality in a
more substantive sense than that suggested by Henry Allison's “formalistic” interpretation. Since, on my
view, fine art in Kant serves as a sensible representation of an undetermined conceptual content, or the Idea
of the highest good, the fourth part of the paper addresses the vexed question of whether Kant's account of
fine art already anticipates the cognitive role later attributed to it by the German Idealists.”
33 “Kant’s Formula of Humanity famously forbids treating others merely as a means. It is unclear, however,
what exactly treating someone merely as a means comes to. This essay argues against an interpretation of
this idea advanced by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. The essay then develops a new interpretation
that suggests an important connection between the Formula of Humanity and Kant’s political philosophy:
the content of many of our moral duties depends on the results of political philosophy and, indeed, on the
results of actual political decision making.”