Chronologische - Ethikseite

2009 [134] Guyer, Paul (2009): Ist und Soll. Von Hume bis Kant, und heute, in Kant und die Zukunft der
europäischen Aufklärung, hrsg. von Heiner Klemme, Berlin, S. 210–31.
2009 [135] Guyer, Paul (2009): Problems with Freedom: Kant’s Argument in Groundwork III and its
Subsequent Emendations, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A
Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 176–202.
2009 [136] Hill, Jr., Thomas E. (Hrsg.) (2009): The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, Malden, MA.
2009 [137] Hills, Alison (2009): Happiness in the Groundwork, in Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S. 29–44.
2009 [138] Holtman, Sarah (2009): Autonomy and the Kingdom of Ends, in The Blackwell Guide to
Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 102–17.
2009 [139] Irwin, Terence (2009): The Development of Ethics. Volume III: From Kant to Rawls, Oxford,
S. 1–172 (66. Kant: Practical Laws. 67. Kant: From Practical Laws to Morality. 68.
Kant: Some Objections and Replies. 69. Kant: Freedom. 70. Kant: From Freedom to
Morality. 71. Kant: Morality and the Good. 72. Kant: Meta-Ethical Questions.).
2009 [140] Johnson, Robert N. (2009): Good Will and the Moral Worth of Acting from Duty, in The
Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA, S. 19–
51.
2009 [141] Johnson, Robert N. (2009): The Moral Law as Causal Law, in Kant’s Groundwork of the
Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide, hrsg. von Jens Timmermann, Cambridge, S.
82–101.
2009 [142] Kain, Patrick (2009): Kant’s Defense of Human Moral Status, Journal of the History of
Philosophy 47, S. 59–101. 43
2009 [143] Kerstein, Samuel J. (2009): Deriving the Supreme Moral Principle from Common Moral Ideas,
in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics, hrsg. von Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Malden, MA,
S. 121–37.
2009 [144] Kerstein, Samuel (2009): Treating Others Merely as Means, Utilitas 21, S. 163–80. 44
And the failure of the argument is the failure of Kant’s nascent effo rts to provide a new, phenomenological
method for the grounding of practical philosophy.”
43 “The determination of individual moral status is a central factor in the ethical evaluation of controversial
practices such as elective abortion, human embryo-destructive research, and the care of the severely disabled
and those in persistent vegetative states. A review of recent work on Kant reveals the need for a careful
examination of the content of Kant’s biological and psychological theories and their relation to his views
about moral status. Such an examination, in conjunction with Kant’s practical-metaphysical analysis of the
origins of freedom, reveals Kant’s principled basis for his contention that all human beings possess moral
status.”
44 “In the Formula of Humanity, Kant embraces the principle that it is wrong for us to treat others merely as
means. For contemporary Kantian ethicists, this Mere Means Principle plays the role of a moral constraint:
it limits what we may do, even in the service of promoting the overall good. But substantive interpretations
of the principle generate implausible results in relatively ordinary cases. On one interpretation, for example,
you treat your opponent in a tennis tournament merely as a means and thus wrongly when you try, through
defeating him, to win first place. The article aims to develop a reconstruction of the Mere Means Principle