Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia - Ethiomedia

208 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia
Corruption and Political Intervention in Ethiopia’s
Justice Sector
Overview of Research Results
Three general points can be made at the outset:
First, none of the 60 individuals interviewed for this study denied the
presence of corruption in the Ethiopian justice system. The one who came
closest eventually admitted that “there was some, but it was very
rare.” 14 Other responses ranged from “a moderate amount” (limited to
the bad apples) to the extreme of holding that “every civil judgment is
sold.” Participants in the two formal focus groups (the first composed
of six federal prosecutors and the second of eight federal First Instance
judges, all picked by their agencies) were less forthcoming than those
interviewed individually, but they were willing to acknowledge the
potential for corruption, both in their own agencies and in others. The
two “spontaneous” focus groups with police and the Federal Ethics and
Anti-Corruption Commission (FEACC), organized on the spot in
Bahir Dar and Addis Ababa, brought what appeared to be franker reactions:
a discussion of the problems of petty corruption and the difficulty
of investigating more serious offenses based on the frequently
vague complaints.
Second, on the topic of political intervention in agency operations and
especially in personnel management, opinions were much more dichotomized.
Even a judge who had been exposed to political interference
(and later resigned, apparently for that reason) claimed this was rare—as
did most, but not the entire, seated bench. Those who felt otherwise are
largely but not exclusively now outside the system. One-on-one interviews
with active members of all three agencies did elicit some negative
comments. However, even the outsiders could point to few real examples
(except for the recent case of a federal High Court judge, criticized
for voicing complaints in a meeting with donors). Instead they referred
(both in the judiciary and the prosecutorial offices) to a sense that
(a) party membership and an ability to please politicians, one’s superiors,
and (in the case of the judges) political members of the Judicial
Administration Councils was what counted, and (b) the lack of transparent
criteria left ample room for purely arbitrary decisions. Similar
reactions were reported in earlier studies (World Bank 2004a; NJI 2008)
and in interviews with donors and NGOs. However, in both formal
focus groups, the prosecutors and judges defended the personnel system
as merit-based and therefore just.