Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia - Ethiomedia

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220 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia prohibition or to set bail even lower, thus giving the defendant a chance to flee. In a few cases, albeit not recently, the government has rearrested defendants released on bail and recharged them as they left the courtroom. Although not constituting corruption, this practice is a clear abuse of respect for judicial decisions, part of the rule of law. Court staff and private attorneys. Finally, in criminal cases, the roles of courtroom staff and the independent bar should be considered. The bar was not seen as active in any likely corruption in criminal justice, probably because few defendants have a lawyer. Although courtroom staff once may have had a critical role (by “losing” files), it is said that the colorcoded file system (an innovation of the modernization program) has made this less possible. In table 5.4 above, that item is thus not bolded, but it might be if other regions were included. One observer did note the possibility of misplacing cases in the transition from the prosecutor’s office to the judiciary. The bench representatives admitted this was possible, but no one else saw it as a major problem. A high-level judge also noted a problem (in both civil and criminal cases) with court staff “selling” a decision to the winning party—based on the staff’s foreknowledge of the outcome. This practice is bolded in table 5.4, but at least at the federal levels, it appears to be under control. Thus, in criminal justice, most observers concluded that real or perceived political intervention was the major source of corruption for the judiciary. Other types of corruption centered on the police, with its ability to either advance cases or stop them in their tracks. Regarding the judiciary, political influence (real or imagined) was assumed to affect the judgment and any appeals. Many of the judicial details potentially subject to political intervention (for example, admission of evidence or decisions on interlocutory motions) were not mentioned; whether this is because they do not occur or simply because they are subsumed under the general rubric of presumed political pressure (or a desire to please political leaders) is unclear. The police’s role in causing provisional closures for failure to bring witnesses or defendants to hearings was also cited. Data do indicate such closures are common, but there is no means of determining how much of this is a result of corruption as opposed to poor working procedures or logistical problems. The Civil Justice Chain Again, we begin with the relevant section of table 5.1, shown below as table 5.5, with bolding to indicate where corruption is most likely. As
Justice Sector Corruption in Ethiopia 221 Table 5.5 Corruption Risks in Civil Justice in Ethiopia’s Justice Sector Filing of claim and pretrial stages Trial and appeal stages Potential forms of corruption • Public officials (in judiciary or outside) direct staff to admit or not admit cases. • Public authorities coerce or bribe private attorneys to file or not file cases. • Court staff solicit or accept bribes or other consideration to accept and process claims. • Lawyers accept bribes from other parties to mishandle cases, or lawyers accept fees from both parties. • Lawyers solicit money from clients to bribe judges or staff, but instead pocket the money. • Lawyers encourage clients to take cases to court that they are bound to lose. • Process servers solicit or accept bribes for nonservice, faster service, false service, and the like. • Public officials (in judiciary or outside) direct staff to speed or delay initial processing of cases. • Lawyers or parties offer or agree to pay court staff for faster or slower scheduling of events or for misplacement of case files. • Public officials (in judiciary or outside) direct judges’ decisions of pretrial motions. • Judges solicit or accept bribes for handling of pretrial motions. • Lawyers file unnecessary motions or appeals to be able to charge clients more. • Public officials (in judiciary or outside) direct court staff to misplace files. • Public officials (in judiciary or outside) direct staff to give them premature access to judicial decisions. • Court staff solicit or accept bribes for access to judicial decisions before they are announced. • Higher authorities or political elites direct judgments or licenses to appeal. • Private attorneys collude with judges for mutual benefit. • Judges solicit or accept bribes for favorable judgments (or to higher-level judges on appeal). • Lawyers or parties engage in jury tampering (if juries are used). • Court staff use knowledge of judgments to “sell” them to winning parties. • Lawyers accept bribes from other parties to mishandle cases. Enforcement • Government agency officials ignore judicial orders to pay or take other action where judgments are against the agency. • Lawyers or parties negotiate with judges, bailiffs, or other parties so that enforcement does not occur. • Court-appointed experts issue under- or overvaluations of assets. • Court-appointed agents, in public auctions, collude to manipulate prices, take over assets at reduced prices, or arrange with private parties to sell for low bid. Source: Author.
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Public Disclosure Authorized Public
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Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia P
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Contents Foreword xiii Preface xv A
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Contents vii Chapter 6 Construction
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Contents ix Map 3.1 Ethiopian Regio
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Contents xi 3.6 Summary of Corrupti
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Foreword The government of the Fede
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Preface Although many would argue t
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Preface xvii Goldie-Scot, Piers Cro
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xx About the Editor and Authors bil
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xxii About the Editor and Authors g
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xxiv Abbreviations GAC Governance a
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CHAPTER 1 Overview Janelle Plummer
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Overview 3 Focusing on Ethiopia, th
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Overview 5 for their knowledge of c
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Overview 7 and group discussion wit
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Overview 9 analysis, Goldie-Scot ge
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Overview 11 Chapter 8: Telecommunic
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Overview 13 might be explained by t
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Overview 15 The perceptions of corr
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Overview 17 Given the Ethiopian gov
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20 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopi
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44 Figure 2.4 Corruption Vulnerabil
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100 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiop
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154 Table 4.4 Corruption Risk in Bo
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Box 6.1 (continued) Construction Se
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Construction Sector Corruption in E
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277 Figure 6.5 Drivers of Corruptio
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292 Table 7.1 Value Chain Analysis
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336 Figure 8.2 Current Institutiona
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CHAPTER 9 Corruption in the Mining
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Corruption in the Mining Sector: Pr
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MOM asks regional or city licensing
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