Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia - Ethiomedia

220 Diagnosing Corruption in Ethiopia
prohibition or to set bail even lower, thus giving the defendant a chance
to flee. In a few cases, albeit not recently, the government has rearrested
defendants released on bail and recharged them as they left the courtroom.
Although not constituting corruption, this practice is a clear abuse
of respect for judicial decisions, part of the rule of law.
Court staff and private attorneys. Finally, in criminal cases, the roles of
courtroom staff and the independent bar should be considered. The bar
was not seen as active in any likely corruption in criminal justice, probably
because few defendants have a lawyer. Although courtroom staff once
may have had a critical role (by “losing” files), it is said that the colorcoded
file system (an innovation of the modernization program) has
made this less possible. In table 5.4 above, that item is thus not bolded,
but it might be if other regions were included. One observer did note the
possibility of misplacing cases in the transition from the prosecutor’s
office to the judiciary. The bench representatives admitted this was possible,
but no one else saw it as a major problem. A high-level judge also
noted a problem (in both civil and criminal cases) with court staff “selling”
a decision to the winning party—based on the staff’s foreknowledge
of the outcome. This practice is bolded in table 5.4, but at least at the
federal levels, it appears to be under control.
Thus, in criminal justice, most observers concluded that real or perceived
political intervention was the major source of corruption for the
judiciary. Other types of corruption centered on the police, with its ability
to either advance cases or stop them in their tracks.
Regarding the judiciary, political influence (real or imagined) was
assumed to affect the judgment and any appeals. Many of the judicial
details potentially subject to political intervention (for example, admission
of evidence or decisions on interlocutory motions) were not mentioned;
whether this is because they do not occur or simply because they
are subsumed under the general rubric of presumed political pressure (or
a desire to please political leaders) is unclear.
The police’s role in causing provisional closures for failure to bring
witnesses or defendants to hearings was also cited. Data do indicate such
closures are common, but there is no means of determining how much of
this is a result of corruption as opposed to poor working procedures or
logistical problems.
The Civil Justice Chain
Again, we begin with the relevant section of table 5.1, shown below as
table 5.5, with bolding to indicate where corruption is most likely. As