PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY - Inter-Parliamentary Union

consensus and the corresponding enforceability of any code of practice. Yet it
could serve as a reasonable rule of thumb that, the more conflicts of interest
are a matter of public concern in a particular country, the more the need for a
clear and enforceable register of interests, and for an impartial figure to
adjudicate such matters, in order to restore or maintain public confidence.
On the matter of mechanisms for enforcing codes of conduct, it is
worth quoting here a paragraph supplied by National Democratic Institute
for International Affairs (NDI) from its work on international standards for
democratic legislatures:
Self-regulation is often insufficient to effectively enforce ethics regulations.
For this reason, many countries have tasked an independent or
non-partisan entity to monitor compliance with ethical codes – as in
the case of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards in the
United Kingdom. The code of conduct is enforced by the Committee on
Standards and Privileges, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
advise the Committee, maintain the Register of Members’ interests,
advise members, confidentially, on registration matters, monitor the
operation of the code and the register; and finally, receive and, if
appropriate, investigate complaints from legislators and citizens.
Whilst the Commissioner cannot impose penalties, a power left to the
Committee, he or she brings to the role greater levels of impartiality
than might reasonably arise from the self-monitoring of an ethics
committee.
Parliamentary attendance
Most parliamentary codes of conduct concern themselves mainly with
financial matters and potential conflicts of interest. However, these are not the
only issues that may affect the confidence of electorates in their representatives.
Also of concern, for example, is the issue of parliamentary attendance.
As has already been noted, TV pictures of largely empty chambers for plenary
sessions can convey a misleading impression, since members may well be
absent on other legitimate parliamentary and constituency business. Most
parliaments regulate their members’ attendance at committees and plenary
sessions through their standing orders, which typically require notification to
the Presiding Officer of reasons for absence. Penalties for ‘unreasonable
absence’ may include any or all of the following:
■ publication of an attendance/absence list;
■ censure or ‘call to order’;
A parliament that is accountable I 103