PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY - Inter-Parliamentary Union

A parliament that is accountable I 107
Scepticism about watertight enforcement, however, should not be read
as an argument for not addressing the issue. Here is what can reasonably
be concluded from these studies about the different legislative strategies
mentioned above:
Regulation
The purpose of regulation is to limit both the demand for resources by parties
and the mode of its supply. Two common measures on the demand side to
contain the electoral ‘arms race’ are: limitations on campaign expenditure; and
restrictions on paid political advertising in the broadcast media, both during
and between elections. On the supply side, contributions may be banned:
above a certain sum; from foreign sources; from organisations rather than individuals.
All such restrictions have to meet with broad political agreement and
be effectively enforced if they are not to be regularly circumvented through
‘creative accounting’.
Public subvention
Public subsidy for political parties is widely unpopular, and can be damaging
if it undermines the incentive for parties to seek income from voluntary
supporters. On the other hand subsidies can go some way towards creating a
more level playing field between parties, and supporting their essential public
role. Subsidies in kind are often seen as preferable to cash subventions. These
can take the form of free broadcast time on public media; free distribution of
election literature; use of public buildings for meetings, and so on. Cash
subsidies can be indirect, through tax exemptions or income tax deductions for
donations; if direct, subsidies above a minimum threshold may be linked to the
size of party membership or membership dues, as an encouragement to
recruiting voluntary support. Subsidies have also been used as an incentive for
good practice in other aspects of party activity, such as candidate selection.
Transparency
In many countries details about party finances are obscure, and known only
to a tight inner circle. Yet here as elsewhere transparency is essential to public
confidence. Effective regulation depends on it; no public subvention is
acceptable without it. And open accounts mean that party members, and competing
parties as well, can contribute to more effective enforcement. This is a
good illustration of the principle that effective accountability is best realised
by a combination of ‘horizontal’ accountability, to a specialised enforcement
agency, with ‘vertical’ accountability, to the public at large.