PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY - Inter-Parliamentary Union

An effective parliament (I): The national level I 129
exercising oversight. The old system of thirteen committees, whose
role, principally, had been to sit in secret in order to ‘rubber-stamp’
the legislation of the National Party government, has given way to a
committee system that is vibrant, active and independent of government.
In the National Assembly there is a committee for each government
department, while in the National Council of Provinces committees
broadly correspond with government departmental clusters. They
have extensive powers, including the power to summon people to give
evidence or produce documents…
The Swedish Parliament, in its submission, notes that nowadays more and
more emphasis is being put on Parliament’s oversight function. ‘This is due to
central government activities no longer being governed by detailed legislation
and budget provisions, but by general targets and result-centred demands.
Parliament’s task becomes that of subsequently checking that these targets
and demands are being met…Here the work and priorities of the Riksdag
committees will take centre stage.’
By definition, oversight is only possible if committees are able to decide for
themselves which aspects of government activity to investigate. In the
Philippines House of Representatives, these are decided by a majority of
committee members:
Aside from the House’s Standing Committee on Oversight, the other
committees of the House may undertake, on their own, a review of the
performance of the government agencies pursuant to their authority to
conduct hearings and inquiries on issues and concerns falling under
their functional jurisdiction, upon the call of the majority of all their
respective members. For instance, certain agencies and departments of
the executive branch were probed on procurement systems and
awarding of contracts, thereby ensuring transparency and paving the
way for policy reforms.
The Norwegian Parliament, by contrast, has recently decided that ‘a
minority of members of the Standing Committee on Scrutiny and
Constitutional Affairs (one third of the members) may initiate proceedings of
the Committee. This rule is essential for the protection of minority factions
in Parliament.’
Crucial to the effectiveness of committee investigations is the power to
require ministers and civil servants to appear and answer questions, and to