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PARLIAMENT AND DEMOCRACY - Inter-Parliamentary Union

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106 I <strong>PARLIAMENT</strong> <strong>AND</strong> <strong>DEMOCRACY</strong> IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY<br />

majority of funds for their campaigns, often at the risk of personal bankruptcy….As<br />

a result, many resort to relationships with individual donors<br />

who expect preferential treatment once the candidate is elected, or worse,<br />

many reformers choose not to run at all, leaving the field to candidates who<br />

are independently wealthy.’ (NDI, p.4)<br />

■ unequal resources. The electoral playing field can be distorted by inequalities<br />

of wealth in society which are differentially accessible to competing<br />

parties. Another distortion occurs where governing parties are able to use<br />

government resources, facilities and patronage improperly to gain<br />

advantage over opposition parties. ‘Only governing parties are in a position<br />

to award contracts, grant other favours or divert state funds illegally to<br />

themselves.’ (IDEA, p.28)<br />

■ compromising sources. Campaign money from powerful interests may be<br />

given in expectation of legislative or other benefits which frustrate the<br />

democratic process or undermine public confidence in the integrity of<br />

government. As the IDEA study puts it succinctly, ‘The issue at stake is<br />

whether interested money should be allowed to override equal voting<br />

rights.’ (p.8)<br />

It should be evident from the above list of concerns that the issue of party<br />

and campaign financing touches on a number of the features of a democratic<br />

parliament treated in this book: on the fairness of the electoral process, and its<br />

capacity to produce a parliament that is politically representative of the<br />

electorate; on parliament’s social representativeness through the role of<br />

personal wealth in access to candidacy; above all, on the degree of parliament’s<br />

accountability to the electorate.<br />

Addressing the concerns<br />

How are these concerns being addressed? The two studies mentioned both<br />

agree that strategies vary enormously according to the individual country context,<br />

and that no single model of good practice is universally applicable. Yet<br />

they also suggest certain guidelines for party financing: a mix of legislative<br />

strategies – regulation, subvention, transparency – is preferable to reliance on<br />

any one; pluralism of sources of financing should be encouraged; legislation<br />

has to be effectively enforced, preferably by a single agency; finally, no system<br />

will ever be completely watertight, since the flow of money is like the<br />

flow of water. ‘No obstacle set up for control purposes will stop trickles from<br />

flowing and siphons from being applied.’ (IDEA, p.13). The NDI study contains<br />

extensive interviews with those involved, which show how legislation<br />

can be evaded in practice, reinforcing this scepticism.

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