op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

serious questions of proportionality.
Problems of coordination within UNPROFOR and between
UNPROFOR and the humanitarian organizations reduced
the utility of U.N. troops for humanitarian support
roles. Within UNPROFOR, there was great unevenness in the
approaches of national battalions to their humanitarian protection
responsibilities and in their willingness to be assertive.
Until April 1993, individual contingents took orders from, and
reported to, their national capitals rather than UNPROFOR
headquarters in Zagreb. In March, there were doubts that the
British battalion would respond to orders from the French
UNPROFOR commander to rescue him from Srebrenica.
Command and control problems within UNPROFOR were
matched by rifts between UNPROFOR and the U.N.’s humanitarian
operations. For the first year and a half, there was
widespread confusion about the respective roles, authority,
and accountability of each. UNHCR, however, understandably
as lead agency responsible for the U.N.’s relief effort,
neither took orders from nor reported to UNPROFOR. It,
however, understandably insisted on a say in decisions related
to the use of U.N. troops for humanitarian support
functions.
In a public display of confusion, the High Commissioner
in February 1993 suspended relief operations in eastern Bosnia
to protect humanitarian operations from further compromise.
The UNPROFOR commander in the area decided to proceed
with convoys already arranged, only to be overruled by the
UNPROFOR Force Commander in Zagreb. The Secretary-
General asserted his command over the entire U.N. system. In
any event, the High Commissioner soon restarted operations
on her own authority.
Some of those involved believed that these problems
suggested the need for humanitarian and military operations
alike to function within a unified command structure. Such a
structure, it was felt, could resolve other shortcomings such as
the absence of parallel decision-making structures, co-located
field offices, and a common frequency for radio communications.
Other officials recommended the opposite: that U.N.
humanitarian activities be given greater operational autonomy.
“Given UNPROFOR’s size,” observed a UNHCR official, “we
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