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of facing down tough interlocutors from the many warring parties. Problems of logistics and security hampered the work of all actors but could have been approached with a common front. However desirable and necessary, a well-orchestrated common effort did not materialize. What emerged was not a single set of U.N. humanitarian activities throughout the region, but many sets; not a well-choreographed division of labor between New York and Geneva but a more disjointed series of activities; not a well-connected network linking its managers to centers of resources and influence in Brussels, Washington, Bonn, London, and Paris but a more random assortment of contacts and channels. Getting basic data on activities illustrated the problem. Asked in its capacity as lead agency for an overview of what the U.N. system had spent on humanitarian activities in the region, UNHCR provided data only on its own activities and suggested that the Department of Humanitarian Affairs could oblige with a system-wide balance sheet. Asked in its capacity as coordinator of the system’s response to complex emergencies, DHA suggested checking with UNHCR. “It’s been a UNHCR initiative from the start,” said DHA, referring both to the humanitarian response and to decisions about how financial data were collected and organized. As a result, fundamental questions remained unanswered about how much the international community had contributed to the U.N. and how much had been spent by it. Related issues such as whether there had been a drop in contributions also remained unclear. While UN-bashers might suspect financial mismanagement, the reality was less insidious: interagency confusion about roles and responsibilities and deeplyingrained agency instincts inhibited system-wide accountability. Operational confusion also provoked questions about the absence of coordination needed to cope with a runaway crisis. The world system’s response to the deteriorating situation in the eastern enclaves in mid-1993 provides an example. In late June, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs sent a cable to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees “regarding the desperate water situation facing the 104
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s attention had been drawn to the crisis by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, who, acting on a report from the scene by MSF- Belgium, had urged prompt and coordinated international action. “I would appreciate it if UNHCR could give urgent attention to the matter,” wrote DHA. “I would be grateful if you could keep me informed of developments and of course at our end we are ready to provide any assistance you may require.” Received in Geneva, Zagreb, and Belgrade, the DHA communiqué met with exasperation bordering on ridicule. For months, UNHCR staff explained, they had been struggling with the very problem that New York had just discovered and was belatedly urging them to address. Their response had been frustrated by the latest problems of access— the imposition of Bosnian Serb taxes on U.N. convoys—and the recurring problem of getting essentials for repairing the water system through the Sanctions Committee in New York and through the Bosnian Serbs in Pale. Both raised doubts about whether piping and spare parts for pumps were humanitarian. (Asked about the Srebrinca incident, DHA explained that it regularly interceded on behalf of UNHCR in New York and shared the MSF letter to energize UNHCR.) Srebrenica’s crisis also illuminated the lack of coordination among the U.N.’s operational agencies. Returning from a fact-finding trip in March 1993 and appalled by the plight of Srebrenica’s women and children, UNHCR personnel had “begged” UNICEF counterparts in Belgrade to help. UNHCR’s request had been referred from UNICEF in Belgrade to its office in Split, which handled activities in the enclaves, and to Zagreb, UNICEF’s base for activities in the region. Its Belgrade office had only a limited inventory (sanctions had taken their toll) and its program priorities ran along other lines. Its Split office eventually dispatched items that ran into difficulties in overland delivery. UNHCR essentially was left to handle the problem itself. Even granted obstacles over which it had little control, the United Nations system, faced with the collapse of Srebrenica’s water system and a looming humanitarian disaster, should have mounted a more effective response. 105
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Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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accountable is the United Nations f
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areas within the former Yugoslavia.
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The deteriorating social situation
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IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
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xiv
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“We got our own hands dirty in th
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civilian populations beyond areas i
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European Union on November 1, 1993
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with its concern for minority popul
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U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
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No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
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How many persons were reached by U.
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the entire population of central Bo
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quantitative data to qualitative ju
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denied access to the centers where
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ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
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also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
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UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
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primary responsibility for the wide
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wars, the terrain was more familiar
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* Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
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teur it appointed was given more au
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port of third-country nationals bac
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followed locally. It became more di
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had two principal contacts: the gov
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national NGOs resident in Serbia an
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and military equipment to Yugoslavi
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Montenegro because the Federal Repu
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munity played a major role in polit
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CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116: has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 121 and 122: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124: tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144: political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146: ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148: takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150: ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152: Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154: Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156: Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158: Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160: Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162: Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164: Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166: Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168: Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
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Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
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ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
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the ICRC suspended relief operation
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Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
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ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
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ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
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167
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