op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

The difficulties encountered in the former Yugoslavia by all humanitarian organizations led to soul-searching by both the principled and the pragmatic. The ICRC, buffeted by recent difficulties in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, and elsewhere, reviewed its own approach and redoubled its efforts to encourage greater fidelity to international humanitarian law. In August 1993, the Swiss government at the ICRC’s urging convened an international conference for the protection of war victims. International humanitarian law was, ICRC President Cornelio Sommaruga told the meeting, “the last bastion of human solidarity.” Recent events also led the U.N. to rethink the terms of its own engagement in situations of internal armed conflict. While most scrutiny was directed toward a perceived overextension of the U.N.’s peacekeeping and peacemaking activities, U.N. humanitarian operations also began to come in for review. The process, however, did not yet include a fundamental examination by the world body of alternative means for dealing with belligerents who flout humanitarian values. It also did not examine the tensions created when member units of the same organization conduct humanitarian programs sideby-side with peacekeeping and peacemaking activities. The Balance Sheet As of late 1993, the jury was still out on whether one approach was more successful than the other in the former Yugoslavia. In a setting in which staff members of both schools were hunkering down in the same quarters in the same towns, the early evidence did not point decisively to the greater success of one approach or the other. However, several elements were already a matter of record. First, the belligerents differentiated among organizations and took the best deal they could get. In the area of assistance, the parties sooner or later generally agreed to the conditions stipulated by UNHCR, the basic supplier, for lifting the suspension of food deliveries, although problems also recurred. In the area of protection, the requests of UNHCR to visit detention centers, unlike those of the ICRC, had few or no conditions attached. As a result, ICRC feared that visits of- 82
fered at a “lower price” would undermine the stricter criteria it used to enhance protection and ensure the credibility of the process. Those who made concessions could well undercut those adhering to principle. Second, pragmatic humanitarian organizations which made some concessions during the first two years may have to make more. Conversely, principled organizations that have refused to make concessions may have continued trouble sustaining access to those in need. Neither approach is assured of success. Finally, there appeared to be no direct correlation between the amount of public criticism and the level of cooperation elicited from the respective belligerents. While less outright challenge might seem in theory to induce greater cooperation, the fact that public criticism was seldom backed up in practice by stronger measures may have made it more tolerable. 6. Determining the Appropriate Uses of the Military The discussion in the previous section reviewed different approaches to winning the consent of uncooperative belligerents to humanitarian activities. What of moving beyond the consentual and applying force to extract cooperation? Did United Nations troops play a role in using force in support of humanitarian operations? In a broader sense, what were their contributions to the U.N.’s humanitarian response to the crisis? Visible and Invisible Contributions Three positive contributions by military personnel to humanitarian activities stand out. First, military officials made their expertise available to those in charge of relief operations. UNPROFOR personnel provided daily briefings in Zagreb to the UNHCR Special Envoy and other United Nations personnel. Regular sessions also were held to which aid organizations outside the U.N. were invited. In Zagreb, Split, Sarajevo, and Belgrade, these meetings took place at least weekly. UNPROFOR maps of the ever-changing frontlines were distributed, recent security incidents discussed, observations 83
Page 1 and 2:
Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3:
CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7:
accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9:
areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11:
The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13:
IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15:
xiv
Page 16 and 17:
“We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19:
civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21:
European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23:
with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25:
U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27:
No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29:
How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31:
the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33:
quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35:
denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37:
ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39:
also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41:
UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43:
primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45:
wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95: here than in any previous conflict
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116: has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120: town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124: tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144: political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146: ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
show all

op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?