op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

observed, the situation was reversed. The U.N. had food in
hand but greatly reduced access due to the spreading of the
conflict to central Bosnia. Another gap was threatening to
develop in the food pipeline in early 1994 unless additional
pledges were made.
In short, United Nations humanitarian operations after
two years were paradoxically both better orchestrated and
more insecure. With serious start-up problems largely past,
activities were better managed. However, the U.N. was steadily
losing ground in its battles against winter, obstructionism by
the warring parties, and donor fatigue.
9. Achieving Effective Use of Human Resources
A major humanitarian undertaking requires massive and
diverse resources. The mobilization and management of a
complex array of funds, food, medicine, shelter materials, and
transport already have been described. Behind such an operation
were people whose leadership and support were critical
to its success. U.N. performance in meeting the challenge of
mobilizing and managing human resource is discussed in this
section.
Outside Assistance
An accurate tally of the numbers of persons from outside
the region who were involved in the work of the humanitarian
organizations since November 1991 is not available. An educated
guess, however, would place the number of expatriate
personnel from the U.N.’s humanitarian organizations and
secretariat, donor governments and intergovernmental organizations,
international NGOs, and the ICRC in the thousands.
Estimating the average time spent in the region by these
visitors is even more conjectural. Many served on short-term
assignments, visited the region on fact-finding missions or
research, or were rotated out for reasons of security or duress.
Taking into account the sojourns of those on short assignments
as well as the stays of those who remained for a year or more,
the average time spent in the region was probably no more
than several months.
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