op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
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10. Assisting Civilians without Prolonging the War<br />
As the humanitarian involvement of the United Nations in<br />
the crisis approached the end of its second year, the conflicts<br />
proceeded with no end in sight. With each setback in the peace<br />
process, a negotiated settlement seemed harder to imagine, let<br />
alone achieve.<br />
As peace prospects receded and a potentially catastr<strong>op</strong>hic<br />
winter loomed, a single question came into sharper focus: was<br />
humanitarian assistance keeping the conflict alive? While<br />
evidence from our interviews was fragmentary, the question<br />
was clearly legitimate. One of the key measures by which the<br />
U.N.’s humanitarian ef<strong>for</strong>t would be judged was whether it<br />
had prolonged the war.<br />
Keeping the War Alive<br />
“We’ve prolonged the war by being here,” lamented an<br />
official of one major NGO. “If there had been no humanitarian<br />
intervention, the war would have been over sooner. It might<br />
have been ugly, but it would be over.” Having provided lifesaving<br />
essentials <strong>for</strong> civilian p<strong>op</strong>ulations on all sides, the<br />
international community had, in effect, freed the protagonists<br />
to fight more single-mindedly <strong>for</strong> their political objectives.<br />
Speaking privately, some U.N. officials acknowledged a similar<br />
view. “We don’t know who the end-users are,” said one,<br />
reflecting on difficulties of monitoring relief supplies. “We’re<br />
feeding all three armies.”<br />
Had inordinate amounts of relief supplies ended up in the<br />
hands of the militaries and fed the tro<strong>op</strong>s? This question was<br />
hard to answer because of the difficulties of monitoring already<br />
noted. UNHCR had started systematic monitoring in<br />
the Sarajevo area only in the fall of 1993, when, according to<br />
one official, the tonnage arriving significantly exceeded civilian<br />
food needs. Two British army officers deputized by UNHCR<br />
concluded from their initial monitoring in October that over<br />
half of the food going to Muslim areas was being pr<strong>op</strong>erly<br />
distributed. <strong>The</strong>y had not reached a judgment about Serb<br />
areas.<br />
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