op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

of facing down tough interlocutors from the many warring
parties. Problems of logistics and security hampered the work
of all actors but could have been approached with a common
front.
However desirable and necessary, a well-orchestrated
common effort did not materialize. What emerged was not a
single set of U.N. humanitarian activities throughout the
region, but many sets; not a well-choreographed division of
labor between New York and Geneva but a more disjointed
series of activities; not a well-connected network linking its
managers to centers of resources and influence in Brussels,
Washington, Bonn, London, and Paris but a more random
assortment of contacts and channels.
Getting basic data on activities illustrated the problem.
Asked in its capacity as lead agency for an overview of what
the U.N. system had spent on humanitarian activities in the
region, UNHCR provided data only on its own activities and
suggested that the Department of Humanitarian Affairs could
oblige with a system-wide balance sheet. Asked in its capacity
as coordinator of the system’s response to complex emergencies,
DHA suggested checking with UNHCR. “It’s been a
UNHCR initiative from the start,” said DHA, referring both to
the humanitarian response and to decisions about how financial
data were collected and organized.
As a result, fundamental questions remained unanswered
about how much the international community had contributed
to the U.N. and how much had been spent by it. Related
issues such as whether there had been a drop in contributions
also remained unclear. While UN-bashers might suspect financial
mismanagement, the reality was less insidious: interagency
confusion about roles and responsibilities and deeplyingrained
agency instincts inhibited system-wide accountability.
Operational confusion also provoked questions about the
absence of coordination needed to cope with a runaway crisis.
The world system’s response to the deteriorating situation in
the eastern enclaves in mid-1993 provides an example.
In late June, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian
Affairs sent a cable to the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees “regarding the desperate water situation facing the
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