op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

eneficiary population had been reached (and it was not), the
amount available per person for all food, health, shelter, and
social services needs would have been about $7 per month,
including administrative overhead.
The six subsequent appeals followed the same general
pattern, with per capita requests edging upward. For the first
six months of 1994, the resources requested for a planned
beneficiary population of 800,000 in Croatia totaled $99.8
million: that is, about $125 per person, or $21 per month. In
Bosnia and Herzegovina, $270.3 million would be shared
among 2,740,000 beneficiaries for about $100 per person, or
$16 per month. For populations, particularly in eastern and
central Bosnia, who were largely or totally dependent upon
outside assistance for everyday essentials, these figures were
paltry.
United Nations officials were well aware of the facts. For
example, requesting $522.6 million for U.N. activities during
the first half of 1994, the latest Consolidated Appeal confirmed
that it “does not attempt to assess and respond to the totality
of needs throughout the former Yugoslavia, but rather focuses
upon those which are within the capacity and competence of
its agencies and their partners to deliver and implement.” The
caveat represents a major concession in what should have
been a comprehensive and inclusive approach. Rather than
describing existing needs, U.N. officials sought to keep their
requests “realistic.” Even then the funds requested, if received,
would have been hard-pressed to do the job described.
U.N. programs throughout the region were not funded
“on the cheap.” Significant resources were provided by donor
governments, (see Figure 2.3 on page 32), and were supplemented
by funds raised from other constituencies, including
NGOs. As with other major United Nations operations that
combine peacekeeping and humanitarian activities, however,
the lion’s share of the resources went to UNPROFOR. The
question remains whether, given limited resources, more could
have been accomplished had they been differently allocated.
Even without further analysis, it is clear from the Balkan
mathematics that the programs planned, like the assumptions
of the planning process itself, were unrealistic from the outset.
If the U.N.’s decision not to challenge donor governments
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