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quantitative data to qualitative judgments was also more pronounced. Moreover, in conflicts where persons protected one moment easily fall into danger the next, it is difficult to assess the protection they receive at any one time. Also of critical importance is the issue of whether protection activities suffered as a result of magnitude of material assistance. The U.N.’s protection work proved to be among the most controversial elements in its entire humanitarian operation, largely because it embraced a new approach. Known as preventive protection, this entailed protecting people who had not yet left their homes in an effort to prevent ethnic cleansing. This represented a radical departure for UNHCR, whose traditional mandate had involved working with refugees once they had left their countries of origin. Compared to assistance activities, the protection effort received fewer resources and represented only a small part of the overall humanitarian effort. At the end of 1993, UNHCR had about 25 officers with protection responsibilities in the former Yugoslavia. Some of these were full-time officers, others were field officers with some protection duties as well. They were assisted in several locations by national staff. Principal duties included protecting asylum seekers, halting the expulsion of refugees, and monitoring the treatment of minorities. According to UNHCR’s Protection Report, its officers in Croatia succeeded in regularizing the status of about 100,000 unofficial refugees or asylum seekers by providing papers, following up their cases with the Croatian government, and protesting when they did not receive refugee status and were threatened with refoulement (forcible repatriation). By their physical presence, protection officers also managed to stop expulsions of refugees at seaports, bus terminals, and police stations, and to secure readmission to Croatia of some expelled refugees. Beyond their traditional role in defending asylum seekers, stateless persons, and refugees, UNHCR protection officers also interceded in cases where minorities were subjected to discrimination and threatened with expulsion. On occasion they even took the authorities to court. In Osijek, UNHCRinitiated legal action won citizenship rights for about 200 Serbs 18
and, in Zagreb, the return of confiscated Serb property. UNHCR staff also organized seminars for civilian and military judges and police. Protection during a war is not only difficult but also dangerous. Yet, as in any humanitarian crisis, it was the physical presence of U.N. officials that provided the best guarantee. The UNHCR protection officer in Zenica worked closely with the British battalion based at Vitez. On September 10, there was a fight near the British base, after which Croat soldiers came looking for Muslim villagers to trade as hostages or to kill. The officer foiled the soldiers’ plans by asking the British UNPROFOR commander to escort 30 Muslims out of the village to Novi Travnik. Working in the war zone of Central Bosnia, where fighting between Muslims and Croats had claimed thousands of lives, UNHCR officials were engaged in protection every day. On one occasion, an official happened upon four Muslims who had been taken off a Red Cross ambulance and were detained in a cinema. On another, he accompanied a field officer of the U.N. Centre for Human Rights to visit the embattled Muslim enclave of Stare Vitez. But for every uplifting success, there were many demoralizing failures. A member of the Humanitarianism and War Project team accompanied a UNHCR protection officer to the small village of Rotilj, just outside the Croat-held stronghold of Kiseljak in Central Bosnia. Much to the embarrassment of UNPROFOR headquartered there, the Croats had gathered together Muslims from surrounding villages and herded them into Rotilj. The Croat commander said this was for their own safety, but the UNHCR visit uncovered disturbing information. Twenty-two Muslims were taken out each day and forced to dig trenches at the Croat lines; several Muslim men had disappeared; some of the Muslims were living in houses that had been destroyed; and only the women were permitted out to pick up food. There was little that the protection officer could do beyond registering his concerns with the local authorities. When Croatian authorities rounded up large numbers of refugees without papers in 1992, UNHCR protection officers as well as officials from the U.S. and German embassies were 19
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3: CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7: accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9: areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 16 and 17: “We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37: ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41: UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84:
war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86:
Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88:
tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90:
eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92:
with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94:
humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96:
here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98:
fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100:
Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102:
ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104:
had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106:
Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108:
some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110:
In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144:
political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
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