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ambassador Mohamed Sacirbey, “the humanitarian agenda has been hijacked by those prepared to use humanitarian ideals as a means of promoting inaction.” Acknowledging that “The U.N. humanitarian organizations did their best in a difficult situation,” Sacirbey nevertheless concluded that “While they saved lives, the people rescued are relegated to a miserable existence.” In the spring of 1993, the Bosnian Foreign Minister requested the pullout of both United Nations military and humanitarian personnel. His request was upstaged by other developments in the region and not discussed seriously. Implications for Other Humanitarian Organizations Association with the U.N.’s political and military entities created problems not only for its humanitarian organizations, but also for other humanitarian agencies. The impacts of the sanctions were even more disruptive for NGOs than for the U.N.’s own humanitarian entities. NGOs had the worst of two worlds. They were required to seek case-by-case approval of relief supplies and other imports. “Everything I plan is affected by the embargo,” said Dr. Geneviève Begkoyian, Belgrade Coordinator for Médecins sans frontières. “If I need to order an aspirin tablet, I must plan on two months delay for clearance by the Security Council before it can even be shipped.” At the same time, NGOs had to rely on governments and international organizations to plead their case to the Sanctions Committee, where they lacked standing. While some NGOs welcomed such help in expediting their requests, others viewed government advocacy on their behalf as inappropriate, given their international, nonpolitical nature. The indirect effects of sanctions were also substantial, particularly on the politicization of NGO activities. “Humanitarian organizations here are on the bad side” of the conflict, continued the MSF’s Begkoyian from her vantage point in Serbia, “and so people are not willing to provide donations. Nobody wants to help Serbs, even though they need assistance and are bona fide refugees.” Another Belgrade-based NGO executive observed, “A Serb fleeing from Croatia into Serbia 100
has exactly the same problems—lack of resources, need for housing and a job—as a Croat fleeing from Serbia into Croatia.” Yet the former received significantly less attention than the latter, he noted. Sanctions also discouraged NGOs from taking the extra time and expense needed to send relief items into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. When interviewed by the team in June 1993, the IFRC, which handled the shipping for the network of national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, was impatiently awaiting Sanctions Committee clearance for clothing from Canada and Germany, medical kits from Switzerland, baby items from Belgium, and food from Norway, as well as medical and hygiene items purchased with its own funds. It already had diverted a shipment of 200 medical kits, recommended for Serbia and Montenegro by WHO and purchased by the Swiss Red Cross, to Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where no such obstacle course existed. Responses by U.N. Humanitarian Organizations U.N. humanitarian officials sought to protect the integrity of their work in various ways. Some went to great lengths to keep their distance from what they called “the other U.N.” Many with region-wide responsibilities used separate sets of business cards, listing offices separately to avoid provocation. Some prefaced discussions in the field with a disclaimer distinguishing themselves from UNPROFOR. “We’re here to help you,” they reported saying. To emphasize their independence from the political and military United Nations, some suggested painting their vehicles “U.N. blue” as against “UNPROFOR white.” Accepting their affiliation, other officials sought to make the best of a difficult situation, noting that a certain institutional schizophrenia should be expected and accepted. “We are a part of the U.N. system and will always be seen as that,” said Thomas McDermott, UNICEF’s Special Representative to the Republics of Former Yugoslavia. Even where United Nations troops are involved, he noted, there will be human needs that require the special expertise of humanitarian professionals. With people suffering, McDermott said, “We have to be 101
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Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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accountable is the United Nations f
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areas within the former Yugoslavia.
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The deteriorating social situation
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IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
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xiv
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“We got our own hands dirty in th
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civilian populations beyond areas i
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European Union on November 1, 1993
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with its concern for minority popul
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U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
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No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
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How many persons were reached by U.
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the entire population of central Bo
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quantitative data to qualitative ju
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denied access to the centers where
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ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
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also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
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UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
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primary responsibility for the wide
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wars, the terrain was more familiar
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* Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
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teur it appointed was given more au
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port of third-country nationals bac
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followed locally. It became more di
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had two principal contacts: the gov
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national NGOs resident in Serbia an
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and military equipment to Yugoslavi
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Montenegro because the Federal Repu
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munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 117 and 118: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120: town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124: tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144: political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146: ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148: takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150: ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152: Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154: Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156: Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158: Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160: Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162: Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164: Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
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Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
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Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
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Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
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ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
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the ICRC suspended relief operation
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Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
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ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
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ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
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167
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