op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

Montenegro because the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia refused to consent to their deployment. Nor was UNPROFOR able to deploy in Serb-held parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the focal point of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs. A Canadian battalion waited for months to gain access to the Banja Luka area. UNPROFOR’s absence in Serb-controlled areas had serious implications not only for perceptions of its political evenhandedness but also for U.N. humanitarian action, given the volume of assistance going to these areas and the widespread human rights abuses directed against minorities there. For each of the three areas where UNPROFOR was deployed its mandates and configurations differed, but the U.N. presence was called “UNPROFOR” throughout. The fact that the UNPROFOR label encompassed political as well as military functions and personnel also made for confusion. Its strength in October 1993 totaled 25,612, including military, police, and civilian personnel from three dozen contributing nations. UNPROFOR troops in all three countries took their orders from headquarters in Zagreb and answered to the UNPROFOR Force Commander there. UNPROFOR police and civilian personnel reported to UNPROFOR’s Head of Civil Affairs. Reflecting on UNPROFOR’s respective contribution to the United Nations’ overall response to the Yugoslav crisis, UNPROFOR’s Head of Civil Affairs Cedric Thornberry told the team, “UNPROFOR has supported the U.N.’s humanitarian agencies in their work. However, because of the circumstances of the mission, UNPROFOR has itself increasingly engaged in direct humanitarian support activities through all its main elements: military, civilian, and police.” Other senior UNPROFOR officials concurred in Thornberry’s judgment that UNPROFOR’s humanitarian roles had represented “much the most important feature of our work.” However, that appraisal was seriously questioned by some observers. The U.N.’s humanitarian organizations viewed UNPROFOR’s contribution as more modest and doubted that it had ever received much priority among UNPROFOR tasks. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights also had another view. He criticized UNPROFOR for becoming involved in the violation of international humanitarian 46
law, a charge to be examined later. In the final analysis, the contribution of the Security Council to an effective humanitarian response by the United Nations to the Yugoslav crisis should not be judged by the number of resolutions passed or the number of personnel deployed but rather by the impact of its decisions and coherence of its involvement. Viewed from a humanitarian standpoint—and there are other criteria by which its involvement may also be judged—the Security Council had much difficulty in defining its responsibilities, determining the advisability and appropriate level of the military force, and accommodating the views of U.N. and other humanitarian institutions in its decision-making processes. In addition to the Security Council, the offices of the Secretary-General and the Departments of Political Affairs and Peace-keeping were preoccupied by the crisis. (The General Assembly passed a number of resolutions but was not a major player.) Two Secretaries-General helped chart the U.N.’s response. Before his departure from office at the end of 1991, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar appointed a Personal Envoy, Cyrus Vance, to explore the feasibility of deploying a U.N. peacekeeping force in Yugoslavia. Actual deployment of U.N. troops took place during the term of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. He was an outspoken critic of European governments and the Security Council itself for lavishing disproportionate attention on Yugoslavia in 1992 when Somalia was experiencing extreme starvation, a somewhat ironic criticism in light of subsequent developments. He also chided the major powers for not including the U.N. more fully in their deliberations about the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. Reports by the two Secretaries-General, formulated with the help of secretariat departments, shaped Security Council action. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPK) was the point of contact between UNPROFOR and the U.N. secretariat, providing broad oversight of it and other U.N. peacekeeping operations. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA) provided secretariat services, and a link to the U.N., for ICFY described below. Working more closely with the U.N., the European Com- 47
Page 1 and 2:
Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3:
CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7:
accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9:
areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 16 and 17: “We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33: quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37: ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41: UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144:
political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
show all

op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?