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ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the case of the safe havens, the Special Rapporteur recommended that their boundaries be widened to make them economically viable and that an adequate number of UNPROFOR troops be deployed to make them truly secure. Reinforcing their local activities, U.N. officials worked with governments in the region to deter abuses against civilians. They used data such as that described above to appeal to governments in Zagreb, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Pale to halt inhumane practices. In the spring of 1993, UNHCR prevailed on the Croatian government to restart registering Muslim refugees, a process suspended in mid-1992. The initiative was important to many who, lacking proper documentation, were subject to refoulement to Bosnia. The Special Rapporteur also interceded with governments in the region and in one case was credited with having halted expulsions of refugees from Croatia to Bosnia. U.N. officials also enlisted the international media in generating outrage at what was taking place. This spurred governments and U.N. bodies to act and led to concessions from governments in the region. The international outcry following media exposure of detention camps in Bosnia, for example, succeeded in persuading the local authorities to allow the International Committee of the Red Cross entry and to close most of the camps. Reports by the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights also sparked the action of governments. For example, his recommendation regarding the creation of safe havens in Bosnia was accepted. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees at the international level and successive Special Envoys in the region were emphatic in urging states to provide asylum to refugees from the former Yugoslavia. “The right to seek and to enjoy asylum and the corresponding duty of non-refoulement,” Sadako Ogata said in a statement to the 49th Session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in March 1993, “are the cornerstone of international protection.” The asylum record, however, was disappointing. As of June 1993, Germany had accepted more than 300,000 persons from the former Yugoslavia, but Britain had taken only 4,424 and France only 4,200. Some linked UNHCR’s policy of pre- 22
ventive protection in the former Yugoslavia to this result, asserting that UNHCR responded more to the restrictive sentiments of European governments than to the needs of the region’s refugees. To encourage governments to open their doors to refugees in need of protection and relocation, UNHCR in 1992 endorsed the concept of “temporary protected status.” It was not, however, particularly vigorous in promoting this policy. By the fall of 1993, 25 governments outside the former Yugoslavia had offered a total of 27,710 places for temporary protection or resettlement, mainly for former inmates of detention centers and their dependents. These had become an object of special concern as a result of widely publicized concentration camp-like conditions. By early October, however, only 12,987 former detainees and their dependents (almost all of them Muslims) had left for abroad. The limited numbers benefiting led to questions about whether UNHCR had assigned sufficient staff and was processing cases expeditiously. The sparse number of places offered by governments (for example, the United States allocated 1,000) also led to questions about whether UNHCR was pressing countries energetically enough to take in former detainees and other victims of violence. The appropriateness of discouraging resettlement for persons other than ex-detainees was also an item of debate. Measuring the effectiveness of protection activities is not easy. Looking back, the first UNHCR Special Envoy, José- Maria Mendiluce, concluded that “we have saved thousands of people who were trapped,” whether by negotiating ceasefires, assisting and protecting them where they were, or evacuating them. Yet he and his successor, Nicholas Morris, emphasized that mass violations of human rights continued, as the Medak incident confirmed. Similarly, the Special Rapporteur, who credited the U.N. with reducing violations, also noted, “In spite of the high level of commitment of the United Nations personnel—UNPROFOR and UNHCR—they are unable to protect adequately the affected populations and in many circumstances are helpless to prevent violations of human rights.” Isolating the role played by the U.N. in deterring abuse is 23
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3: CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7: accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9: areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 16 and 17: “We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33: quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41: UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88:
tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90:
eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92:
with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94:
humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96:
here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98:
fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100:
Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102:
ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104:
had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106:
Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108:
some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110:
In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144:
political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
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