op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

More documents

Recommendations

Info

NATO troops into the Bosnian interior—might have produced more positive results. We agreed, however, that as with the limited-force approach actually used, each alternative would have had its own set of ramifications on the operational landscape for humanitarian activities. We also agreed that the choices actually made regarding the appropriate role and level of force failed to “get it right.” 7. Protecting the Integrity of Humanitarian Action Threats to the integrity of humanitarian action in the former Yugoslavia came not only from operating in war zones amidst obstructions thrown up by the warring parties but also from the U.N.’s own response. Two events illustrate the issue. WHO Director-General Hiroshi Nakajima wrote the U.N. Secretary-General on August 27, 1993 about the serious deterioration in the health situation of “the entire population” in Serbia and Montenegro. With winter approaching, medicines and heating oil were in extremely short supply. Noting that the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council was causing severe shortages of pharmaceuticals (the ingredients of which the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had offered to purchase abroad), he suggested that the Sanctions Committee “may wish to consider defreezing funds for purely medical and humanitarian purposes.” He offered WHO’s services to verify that raw materials imported for the production of pharmaceuticals were used for those purposes. He received no reply. The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki noted in an October 1992 report that because of the crush of 700,000 refugees and displaced persons already in Croatia: UNPROFOR, which controls much of the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, is being forced to limit their entry into the...UNPAs. Many displaced Muslims have been turned away at the border and 92
some of those persons who have already crossed it, including those of military age, are being sent back both by UNPROFOR and the Croatian authorities. It is extremely regrettable that UNPROFOR has been forced to violate the principle of non-refoulement. These incidents suggest a United Nations security apparatus—Sanctions Committee, UNPROFOR, and the Security Council itself—hostile to the protection and assistance needs of the war-torn region. In fact, concern for the well-being of civilian populations played a newly prominent role in U.N. affairs—not only in the Balkans but also in northern Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. The difficulty was rather that the political and military strategies adopted did not advance the stated humanitarian goals. We review the extent to which the integrity of the U.N.’s humanitarian activities in the former Yugoslavia was compromised by their association with the world body’s political and military actions. Association with the Political In a series of resolutions, the Security Council imposed, reaffirmed, and tightened economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). In forbidding all trade, Resolution 757 of May 30, 1992 authorized the Sanctions Committee to allow the entry of foodstuffs, medical supplies, and UNPROFOR-related goods and services. Tightening the sanctions, Resolution 820 of April 17, 1993 reaffirmed the earlier exemption for medical supplies and foodstuffs and added a category of “other essential humanitarian supplies,” which, like the other exceptions, would be approved as previously by the Sanctions Committee using a case-by-case, no-objection procedure. The economic sanctions, explained U.N. secretariat staff to the team, “were intended to change the attitudes and policies of the government or persons in authority, not to hurt innocent people.” Yet they had three direct and three indirect impacts on civilian populations and on those seeking to assist 93
Page 1 and 2:
Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3:
CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7:
accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9:
areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11:
The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13:
IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15:
xiv
Page 16 and 17:
“We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19:
civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21:
European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23:
with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25:
U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27:
No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29:
How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31:
the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33:
quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35:
denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37:
ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39:
also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41:
UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43:
primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45:
wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47:
* Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49:
teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51:
port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53:
followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55:
had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116: has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120: town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124: tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144: political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146: ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148: takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150: ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152: Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154: Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156: Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
show all

op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?