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coordination and less as one of operation. Some of those interviewed also believed that a lead agency that was so massively operational put itself at an institutional advantage over its partners, discouraging the cooperation it sought. The lead agency does not necessarily need to be the largest agency. Where in all this was the Department of Humanitarian Affairs, created specifically to ensure more effective coordination among U.N. organizations in complex emergencies? While DHA was not on the scene in late 1991, when UNHCR received its mandate, it was in existence the following April, by which time the magnitude of the lead agency’s task increased. Some suggested that had the Secretary-General’s letter been written in April 1992 rather than the previous October, it should have been addressed to DHA. Others believe that letter or no letter, DHA should have made the Yugoslav crisis its first major item of business, even though by April UNHCR was already well established and DHA was starting from scratch. Still others hold that given its lack of staff with operational backgrounds, DHA was wise to keep its distance. In any event, DHA in New York functioned in quiet— some would say, invisible—ways. It provided a liaison between ambassadors from the region and the U.N.’s humanitarian apparatus; monitored discussions in the Security Council; kept in touch with the peacekeeping and political affairs officials and briefed the Secretary-General on developments; helped prepare international conferences on the former Yugoslavia, which it co-chaired with UNHCR; participated in missions to the region; and played a role in several efforts to secure humanitarian access. It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these efforts. DHA’s interaction with the Secretary-General and other departments appears not to have been regular or sustained. Despite procedural changes that reduced access of U.N. secretariat staff to Security Council deliberations, ways could have been found to influence more concretely the content of resolutions affecting humanitarian issues. More could certainly have been done, said one close observer of Security Council ambassadors in action, “to keep humanitarian issues in the center of their minds.” Active and sustained advocacy by DHA with the Sanctions Committee on behalf of all humanitarian organiza- 108
tions would also have been constructive. In Geneva, DHA was a more visible and assertive part of U.N. efforts to respond to the crisis. DHA chaired the Inter- Agency Standing Committee and staffed the Inter-Agency Support Unit, which were active in mobilizing resources and tracking pledges and expenditures. Its roles in the last four consolidated appeals ranged from merely participating as one member in the assessment missions on which they were based to co-signing with UNHCR the finished product. One of DHA’s major contributions to the U.N. system as a whole was to replace individual appeals by individual United Nations organizations for particular crises with joint appeals. As noted earlier, however, the consolidated appeals for the former Yugoslavia left much to be desired in terms of methodology and data. DHA also did not systematically follow up on the appeals with direct advocacy in key capitols. Close scrutiny of the October 1993 appeal—and the quality of the appeals improved over time—suggests a number of serious problems. The document did not articulate the objectives of U.N. humanitarian activities in the region. It presented not a common strategy but a compilation of approaches, not a set of system-wide priorities but a catalogue of activities. It also did not present an approach for dealing with the warring parties or outline ground rules and criteria according to which activities would be carried out—or suspended. In short, there was a limited value-added element in DHA’s involvement. The shortcomings reflected not only a dearth of assertiveness on DHA’s part but also a lack of clear authority vested in it to resolve interagency differences. DHA also suffered from a reluctance among operational U.N. agencies to see it play a major role. Yet despite problems beyond DHA’s control, it could have played a far more constructive role than it did. In short, the interaction between UNHCR and DHA would have been more productive had the omnipresent and energetic lead agency delegated more activities and had the neophyte coordinating vehicle become more assertive. UNHCR could have used additional help in engaging the political and military U.N. in New York, perhaps functioning more effectively in the field as a result. For its part, DHA’s humanitarian 109
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Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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accountable is the United Nations f
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areas within the former Yugoslavia.
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The deteriorating social situation
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IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
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xiv
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“We got our own hands dirty in th
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civilian populations beyond areas i
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European Union on November 1, 1993
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with its concern for minority popul
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U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
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No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
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How many persons were reached by U.
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the entire population of central Bo
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quantitative data to qualitative ju
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denied access to the centers where
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ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
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also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
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UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
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primary responsibility for the wide
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wars, the terrain was more familiar
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* Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
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teur it appointed was given more au
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port of third-country nationals bac
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followed locally. It became more di
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had two principal contacts: the gov
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national NGOs resident in Serbia an
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and military equipment to Yugoslavi
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Montenegro because the Federal Repu
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munity played a major role in polit
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CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
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homeless and lower-income pensioner
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international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116: has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120: town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144: political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146: ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148: takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150: ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152: Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154: Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156: Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158: Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160: Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162: Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164: Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166: Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168: Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170: Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172: ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
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the ICRC suspended relief operation
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Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
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ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
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ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
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167
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