op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Any report on humanitarian action by the United Nations
in response to the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is an analysis
of a house divided against itself. Ours situates the U.N.’s
humanitarian activities within a context of half-measures and
abandonment of principle on the part of member governments
and the Security Council. Humanitarian efforts were substitutes
for effective decisions by governments and the international
community to end the warfare and unconscionable
violence.
U.N. humanitarian operations to meet life-or-death human
needs—mainly the delivery of food and medicine—
succeeded in reaching a substantial number of those in desperate
situations, keeping people alive and easing their suffering.
Food distribution to refugees and host families in Croatia,
Serbia, and Montenegro made a critical difference to hundreds
of thousands of people, as it also did in Sarajevo, Bihac, and
other Muslim enclaves. U.N. presence sometimes helped deter,
if not prevent, some abuses of human rights. Many individual
U.N. officials toiled with impressive energy, dedication,
and commitment, frequently in situations of great personal
peril. Yet these efforts remained inadequate in the face of
the immense catastrophe.
The United Nations was hampered by the lack of an
overall strategy that anticipated events. The movement of
relief commodities, primarily food, was given priority to the
detriment of other indispensable activities such as social services,
rehabilitation, and the protection of human rights, including
the right to seek asylum. UNHCR, designated “lead
agency” in recognition of its resources and expertise, did not
succeed in fully mobilizing other organizations, in part due to
confusion about the lead agency concept itself. The circumscribed
mandate given UNPROFOR by the Security Council
limited the capacity of troops to protect civilian populations
and support humanitarian operations. Indeed, concern for the
security of UNPROFOR and U.N. humanitarian personnel
blunted consideration of more forceful attempts to end the
bloodshed.
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