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“We got our own hands dirty in the field,” wrote Sir Donald Acheson, WHO’s first Special Representative in the region. WHO (World Health Organization) was unaccustomed to operational activities such as setting up health programs and deploying staff in insecure sub-offices around the region. The newness of the challenge was not limited to the humanitarian actors. Few of UNPROFOR’s battalions had provided protection for humanitarian operations in war zones before. In the absence of a uniform approach, various national contingents approached their task differently. Referring to his assignment to rehabilitate Sarajevo’s infrastructure, the chief engineer of UNPROFOR’s French contingent commented, “This is the first time French engineers have done this.” U.N. peacekeeping troops, drawn from many different countries and without experience or training in humanitarian, human rights, or refugee law, did not always exhibit the ability or commitment to respond well to the needs that confronted them. Novel circumstances pushed many organizations, humanitarian, political, and military alike, beyond traditional missions and standard operating procedures, and, in some instances, beyond expertise and comparative advantage. That the theater of operations was in Europe, paradoxically, increased the difficulty. European nations also had their own sets of relationships with countries in the region—and their own special nervousness about large-scale movements of peoples. Moreover, the organizations that responded to the crisis had no experience in a country that previously had not qualified for emergency or development assistance. Thus there were no “former Yugoslavia” country desks and little accumulated expertise in the aid community. The operational theater was a short plane ride from European capitals or less than a day’s drive for relief trucks and therefore provided a keen sense of immediacy. Yet proximity created problems of a special nature. Politicians and donors had an easier time dropping in on Sarajevo or Zagreb for hastily arranged photo opportunities, complicating the work of humanitarian professionals. Planning and commitments tended to be less urgent. With food and medicines so close at hand, a relaxed mentality developed that was not evident for crises in faraway Liberia or Sri Lanka. The warfare itself, 2
according to prevailing stereotypes, was expected to be less barbaric and shorter-lived than in developing countries. The former Yugoslavia was well-endowed in institutions, infrastructure, and local talent, all of which could be pressed into service, it was thought. Many of these assumptions proved illfounded. Beyond the newness of the challenges, a second reason for the extreme difficulty in this crisis was the complexity of the issues. The conflict resisted easy categorization. Was this a war of territorial aggression by Serbia against Croatia? Was it a war by Serbia, working hand in glove with Bosnian Serbs, against Bosnia and Herzegovina? Was it a civil war within Bosnia and Herzegovina? Whether the conflict was international or internal had a bearing on applicable international law and aid organization mandates. Unlike internal strife, international conflicts triggered a well-understood division of labor among aid agencies. How much was the conflict an ethnic struggle? Understanding the role of ethnicity—and the existence of polyglot communities and multi-ethnic armed forces even among the conflicts—might influence international strategies in approaching the warring parties. The complexity of the conflict also meant dealing with more interlocutors. These included not only Serb authorities in Serbia but also in the Serb Republic of Krajina; Croatian authorities in Croatia and Croatian army and paramilitaries in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and eventually the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia; the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serb authorities in the self-declared Republic Serbska, and even the splinter Muslim faction in the Autonomous Zone of Western Bosnia (Bihac). This confused political situation created even more chaotic operational conditions on the ground. U.N. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, had to deal not only with Serb political and military authorities in Belgrade, Pale (the Bosnian Serb headquarters), and Sarajevo, but also with Serb and Bosnian Serb officials in the field and at roadblocks. Locally, military and especially paramilitary elements called their own shots, regardless of what had been negotiated with higher authorities. U.N. aid officials had similar problems, more formidable still by virtue of their need to reach 3
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3: CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7: accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9: areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33: quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37: ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41: UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68:
homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70:
international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72:
electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74:
UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76:
Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78:
ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80:
sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82:
evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84:
war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86:
Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88:
tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90:
eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92:
with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94:
humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96:
here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98:
fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100:
Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102:
ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104:
had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106:
Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108:
some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110:
In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144:
political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
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