op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

the entire population of central Bosnia, from Zenica to Tuzla.
The war also complicated monitoring the end-uses and
end-users of the food. It is difficult to keep track of food in
every war, and in this set of conflicts the difficulty caused
endless controversy for the United Nations In December 1992,
UNHCR was accused by a USAID consultant of providing 23
percent of its food to the Serbian side—in effect, as a bribe to
ensure Serb cooperation with the aid operation. UNHCR
officials vigorously disputed the allegation, insisting that their
allocations were based on need. Of the 380,000 target beneficiaries
in Sarajevo, they pointed out, about 90,000, or 24
percent, were in Serbian-controlled parts of the capital, although
their needs may have been less extreme than those of
Sarajevo’s Muslims.
There was also controversy over the delivery of food to
Muslims in Sarajevo. Once the food arrived at a central warehouse,
the Bosnian government assumed responsibility for
distribution to the city communes, hospitals, and bakeries.
There were repeated reports that much of this food never
reached those in need, ending up instead on the black market.
One UNPROFOR official estimated that individual Sarajevans
were receiving less than 100 grams a day, a small fraction of the
target.
In the most thorough review to date of these and other
end-use controversies, WFP in November 1993 concluded:
...losses incurred while food aid is under the
control of the U.N. System (WFP, UNHCR,
UNPROFOR) are no more than standard handling
losses....Once the food reaches the municipalities
and communes the scope for distribution
to people other than the identified
displaced and war affected clearly increases.
Even at this level, which is largely out of sight
of the international community, the problem
is believed to be more one of distribution to
other segments of the population rather than
diversion to combatants.
How adequate and helpful was the food provided? The
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