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In a letter sent in June 1993 to their respective Geneva<br />

headquarters, the senior officials in Belgrade of WHO, UNHCR,<br />

and the <strong>International</strong> Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent<br />

Societies (IFRC) noted their “ethical obligation” to call<br />

attention to “the detrimental effect of the sanctions on the<br />

health of the pe<strong>op</strong>le and on the health care system of the<br />

country where we work.” <strong>The</strong>y explained that “While the<br />

sanctions, in principle, do not cover medical supplies, in<br />

practice they have contributed to breaking the health care<br />

system....[A]ll health care institutions in all parts of the country<br />

lack vital drugs, equipment and spare parts.”<br />

In addition to its time-consuming, case-by-case review of<br />

requests <strong>for</strong> commercial drug imports, the Sanctions Committee<br />

refused to authorize imports of raw materials from which<br />

a relatively advanced Serbian pharmaceutical industry could<br />

manufacture drugs itself. Ef<strong>for</strong>ts by Serb health authorities to<br />

arrange visits by outside technicians to repair blood testing<br />

and transfusion equipment were unsuccessful, apparently<br />

reflecting the perception abroad that travel to Belgrade would<br />

undercut the embargo. Serb authorities then shipped the<br />

equipment to Britain <strong>for</strong> repair; it was not returned, apparently<br />

also <strong>for</strong> fear of violating the embargo. WHO reported<br />

that as of June 1993, “4,000 hemodialysis patients live in a<br />

continuous uncertainty.” By September, the Belgrade authorities<br />

had raised the number to 5,000.<br />

Third, assistance activities became much harder to administer.<br />

<strong>The</strong> growing desperation of pe<strong>op</strong>le ineligible <strong>for</strong> aid led<br />

to a higher rate of tampering with beneficiary lists. Some aid<br />

officials expressed the view that the growing unp<strong>op</strong>ularity of<br />

U.N. sanctions made ef<strong>for</strong>ts to subvert the aid program an act<br />

of defiance. Some relief personnel saw a connection between<br />

the embargo, humanitarian aid, and increased criminal activity.<br />

Belgrade authorities linked the sanctions to “corruption,<br />

smuggling, violence,” and other major “changes of ethical and<br />

moral values.”<br />

If the direct impacts of sanctions were wide-ranging, the<br />

indirect repercussions were no less dramatic. First, sanctions<br />

widened an implicit contradiction within humanitarian programs.<br />

From the start, the U.N.’s focus had been on refugees,<br />

more than half a million of whom fled from Bosnia and<br />

95

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