op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
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In a letter sent in June 1993 to their respective Geneva<br />
headquarters, the senior officials in Belgrade of WHO, UNHCR,<br />
and the <strong>International</strong> Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent<br />
Societies (IFRC) noted their “ethical obligation” to call<br />
attention to “the detrimental effect of the sanctions on the<br />
health of the pe<strong>op</strong>le and on the health care system of the<br />
country where we work.” <strong>The</strong>y explained that “While the<br />
sanctions, in principle, do not cover medical supplies, in<br />
practice they have contributed to breaking the health care<br />
system....[A]ll health care institutions in all parts of the country<br />
lack vital drugs, equipment and spare parts.”<br />
In addition to its time-consuming, case-by-case review of<br />
requests <strong>for</strong> commercial drug imports, the Sanctions Committee<br />
refused to authorize imports of raw materials from which<br />
a relatively advanced Serbian pharmaceutical industry could<br />
manufacture drugs itself. Ef<strong>for</strong>ts by Serb health authorities to<br />
arrange visits by outside technicians to repair blood testing<br />
and transfusion equipment were unsuccessful, apparently<br />
reflecting the perception abroad that travel to Belgrade would<br />
undercut the embargo. Serb authorities then shipped the<br />
equipment to Britain <strong>for</strong> repair; it was not returned, apparently<br />
also <strong>for</strong> fear of violating the embargo. WHO reported<br />
that as of June 1993, “4,000 hemodialysis patients live in a<br />
continuous uncertainty.” By September, the Belgrade authorities<br />
had raised the number to 5,000.<br />
Third, assistance activities became much harder to administer.<br />
<strong>The</strong> growing desperation of pe<strong>op</strong>le ineligible <strong>for</strong> aid led<br />
to a higher rate of tampering with beneficiary lists. Some aid<br />
officials expressed the view that the growing unp<strong>op</strong>ularity of<br />
U.N. sanctions made ef<strong>for</strong>ts to subvert the aid program an act<br />
of defiance. Some relief personnel saw a connection between<br />
the embargo, humanitarian aid, and increased criminal activity.<br />
Belgrade authorities linked the sanctions to “corruption,<br />
smuggling, violence,” and other major “changes of ethical and<br />
moral values.”<br />
If the direct impacts of sanctions were wide-ranging, the<br />
indirect repercussions were no less dramatic. First, sanctions<br />
widened an implicit contradiction within humanitarian programs.<br />
From the start, the U.N.’s focus had been on refugees,<br />
more than half a million of whom fled from Bosnia and<br />
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