op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

provides a point of entry.
In the UNPAs, United Nations troops and civilian police
were, in effect, the frontline response of the international
community to human rights and human needs. However,
their training in human rights protection and in international
humanitarian law was inadequate. Their familiarity and working
relationships with UNHCR were also limited. They did not
routinely act to prevent expulsions and ethnic cleansing, nor
did they insist that asylum seekers be allowed entry or help
repatriate those expelled.
UNHCR, which had limited direct presence within the
UNPAs, sought to ensure that refugees from Bosnia and
Herzegovina were able to flee into Croatia, crossing a border
controlled by UNPROFOR, and that once there they were
treated in accordance with international norms. However,
given insufficient UNHCR staff to allow posting at all entry
points, UNPROFOR’s presence was critical.
UNPROFOR claimed that the actions criticized by the
Special Rapporteur were undertaken to meet its agreement
with the Croatian authorities and maintain order in the UNPAs,
which movement in and out might threaten. However,
UNPROFOR actions were questionable to the point that a
recent review by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights
recommended that “Each component of the U.N. response
should have an explicit humanitarian mandate that includes a
requirement to consult and coordinate efforts in the humanitarian,
political, and military spheres.”
How serious was the damage to humanitarian interests
and programs from these and other UNPROFOR activities?
Croatian government officials were careful to distinguish
between the U.N.'s humanitarian and military faces. One
social service professional who had no previous dealings with
the U.N. balanced sharp criticisms of UNPROFOR with “a
very positive view” about UNHCR.
Many in Croatia, however, seemed to equate the U.N. and
UNPROFOR, both of which experienced growing unpopularity
throughout 1993. UNPROFOR was perceived as having
been too weak in dealing with Serbs in the Krajina—no heavy
arms were collected and few of those expelled were allowed to
return, two of the main objectives in its mandate—and in not
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