op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...

tarian organizations did their best to preposition relief supplies
to tide people over, the absence of more massive suffering
owed more to the mildness of the winter than to their
efforts. The lack of adequate preparation for winter seemed
less a function of the U.N.’s unfamiliarity with non-tropical
climates than of its preoccupation with the exigencies of dayto-day
relief operations.
In the winter of 1993, however, the lack of adequate
planning promised to be far more damaging and seemed more
inexcusable. As of October, the indicators were more ominous
than a year earlier. The population was starting with lower
body weights, smaller cash reserves, and fewer locally available
energy sources. While the previous winter’s experience
had led to some improvements—the use of interwoven plastic
sheeting, heavier tape and nails, and stoves that could double
as ovens—broad strategic questions, such as whether to emphasize
the provision of blankets and clothing or the restoration
of power grids were not addressed adequately at the start.
As early as June 1993, efforts were made to plan for winter,
although as some U.N. officials pointed out, June was hardly
“early,” given formidable constraints of access and logistics
and the unsatisfactory performance in 1992. Yet a consolidated
plan for winterization did not have the necessary approvals
in the field and headquarters until September, when
resources still needed to be mobilized. Adequate funding for
winterization never materialized. Funds available for such
programs in Zenica, for example, were reduced from $50
million to $35 million because of resource constraints.
The new International Management Group, created to
accelerate efforts to address shelter, energy, water, and sanitation
needs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in anticipation of the
coming winter, did not begin operations in Zagreb until September
20, 1993 and experienced further delays in locating
office space. In late September, with winter less than a month
away, a staff member made an initial fact-finding visit to
Srebrenica to investigate the possibility of erecting prefab
housing, still to be imported from northern Europe. It did not
issue its first report until October 26.
Insiders acknowledged a lack of the necessary attention to
devising concerted operational strategies. They defended them-
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