op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
op 18 front pages-converted - The Watson Institute for International ...
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with its concern <strong>for</strong> minority p<strong>op</strong>ulations in the 10 multiethnic<br />
areas to be established, arguably led to an increase in<br />
ethnic cleansing as the parties sought to strengthen territorial<br />
claims be<strong>for</strong>e signing any agreement. According to many who<br />
witnessed the events at close hand, subsequent discussions<br />
surrounding the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which sanctioned<br />
the tripartite division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along more<br />
clear-cut ethnic lines, fueled the conflict further still.<br />
As the situation worsened, the holding <strong>op</strong>eration in which<br />
humanitarian organizations had been engaged became less<br />
and less tenable. “<strong>The</strong> failure of the international community<br />
to reverse the logic of war,” said UNHCR Special Envoy<br />
Nicholas Morris in mid-1993, “has meant the failure of humanitarian<br />
<strong>op</strong>erations predicated on the logic of war being<br />
reversed.”<br />
U.N. humanitarian organizations were caught in a no-win<br />
situation. <strong>The</strong>y were tarnished by association with Security<br />
Council decisions that had failed to achieve their stated objectives.<br />
<strong>The</strong>y also were faulted <strong>for</strong> not having found a way of<br />
extracting co<strong>op</strong>eration from the same belligerents who had<br />
ignored the expressed wishes and established standards of the<br />
international community.<br />
<strong>The</strong> political debate had come full circle. In some quarters,<br />
humanitarian organizations were blamed <strong>for</strong> the proliferation<br />
of the suffering that they had been expected to address. Earlier<br />
chastised <strong>for</strong> participating in ethnic cleansing by assisting<br />
pe<strong>op</strong>le to leave dangerous situations, they were later looked to<br />
<strong>for</strong> assistance in whatever p<strong>op</strong>ulation movements might follow<br />
an eventual peace agreement. Diplomats, politicians, and<br />
peacekeeping officials, once critical of humanitarian organizations<br />
<strong>for</strong> suspending <strong>op</strong>erations in the face of insecurity and<br />
abuse, themselves debated whether U.N. tro<strong>op</strong>s would have<br />
to be withdrawn from the <strong>op</strong>erational theater.<br />
Many of those interviewed believe that more decisive<br />
political or military action early on would have made a critical<br />
difference to the credibility of all U.N. ef<strong>for</strong>ts. “We are in the<br />
presence of totally savage <strong>op</strong>erators,” said UNHCR’s Acting<br />
Special Envoy Klaus von Helldorff in March 1993. “If there<br />
were some sense of humanity among them, we would have no<br />
difficulty in supplying pe<strong>op</strong>le fully with what they need. Had<br />
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