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5. Dealing with Belligerents who Defy International Humanitarian Law The crisis in the former Yugoslavia was characterized by the belligerents’ blatant and routine disregard of internationally recognized humanitarian principles. How to respond to cavalier attitudes and practices represented a profound and agonizing challenge for all involved. Varying Approaches Different responses emerged, reflecting various approaches to humanitarian action. The differences were not in the ultimate objective: all sought access to civilian populations in situations in which the warring parties were not ready to grant it. The differences were in the price agencies were willing to pay for access and their success in maintaining such access over time. The International Committee of the Red Cross took what might be called a principled approach. It was guided by its seven humanitarian principles, which have shaped a body of doctrine and procedures governing field operations in armed conflicts around the world. The ICRC gave overriding priority to winning the consent of the belligerents to its activities. In doing so, it reinforced the importance it attached to the obligations of the belligerents to grant access by a corresponding willingness to suspend operations if the belligerents reneged on their obligations. In keeping with its traditional refusal to make fundamental concessions as the price of gaining access, the ICRC stayed with its principles in the former Yugoslavia, even in the absence of early results. “We know your principles,” one general told an ICRC delegate negotiating entry into besieged areas in early 1993, “and we will make you change them.” “We believe in our principles,” countered the delegate. “They’ve been good for 125 years.” Reflecting upon his own efforts to negotiate humanitarian space in the Balkans and elsewhere, another ICRC delegate commented, “The experience here has not made us change. We still think that principles must remain the cornerstone of 78
humanitarian access. A lot of time must be invested in negotiating to preserve those principles from harm.” Faced with the same challenge from the same warring parties, other institutions—including many U.N. humanitarian organizations, UNPROFOR, and some NGOs—were more pragmatic. In negotiating humanitarian space, they ceded the belligerents greater authority over their activities. They bargained their way into difficult-to-access areas by agreeing to provide majority populations with assistance sometimes disproportionate to their actual needs. They acquiesced in what they agreed were uncomfortable links. To be allowed to evacuate minority civilians from an area controlled by one ethnic group, they agreed in certain instances to do the same elsewhere where the majority and minority were reversed. Had they stood on humanitarian principle, the pragmatists said, they would still be standing. “It would be naïve to think, or to insist,” observed UNHCR’s State of the World’s Refugees 1993, “that humanitarian assistance—alone of all the elements involved in a conflict—can be entirely free from calculations concerning ends and means.” The process of calculation was suggested by Wilbert van Hövell in the earlier discussion of ethnic cleansing. The main criterion in assisting with population movements, he wrote, is “whether the persons concerned are in an acute life threatening situation,” a criterion, that had to be “weighed against various local constraints and possible adverse consequences.” Criticized for agreeing to an exchange of dead bodies in return for access to Mostar in mid-1993, Cedric Thornberry, UNPROFOR’s Head of Civil Affairs, commented, “If you don’t make deals, you can’t even get in” to besieged areas and therefore are in no position to provide help. “If you are in nonpolitical humanitarian activities,” he added, “you have to be very political to be successful.” Pluses and Minuses Each approach had liabilities and assets. The principled route requires self-denial on the part of organizations that insist on greater humanitarian space than may be available at a particular time. Negotiation of acceptable terms of access can 79
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Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
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accountable is the United Nations f
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areas within the former Yugoslavia.
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The deteriorating social situation
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IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
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xiv
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“We got our own hands dirty in th
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civilian populations beyond areas i
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European Union on November 1, 1993
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with its concern for minority popul
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U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
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No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
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How many persons were reached by U.
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the entire population of central Bo
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quantitative data to qualitative ju
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denied access to the centers where
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ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
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also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
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UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108: some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110: In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112: indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114: insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116: has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118: Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120: town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122: population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124: tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126: observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128: erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130: Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132: the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134: standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136: 10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138: sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140: that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142: CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
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political, and military entities. O
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ferently. The interface between the
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takings ultimately rely. Second, we
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ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
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Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
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Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
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Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
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Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
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Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
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Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
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Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
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Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
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Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
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Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
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ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
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the ICRC suspended relief operation
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Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
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ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
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ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
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167
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