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UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received its mandate as lead agency from the Secretary-General in a letter dated October 25, 1991. On the basis of its statute, expertise, and experience, UNHCR was requested to assist displaced persons in Yugoslavia. UNHCR at the time had a small office in Belgrade for routine refugee business but no presence in Croatia or Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, in the fall of 1991, as the chronology in Annex 2 notes, the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia was still intact. After a period of rapid turnover in leadership and of lagging donor contributions, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia provided UNHCR with an opportunity to demonstrate its capabilities in a high-profile emergency. Its involvement gave it new prominence as a major player in international humanitarian crises. Its global budget rose from $883 million in 1991 to $1.127 billion in 1992. The extent of its preoccupation with its Yugoslavia work led some officials, however, to question the wisdom of having accepted the lead agency assignment. The task placed the organization on new and unfamiliar terrain, but UNHCR welcomed it. The initial challenge increased in scale and complexity with the outbreak of fighting in April 1992 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the situation in the former Yugoslavia deteriorated, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Mrs. Sadako Ogata wrote to the Human Rights Commission, “our work has increasingly involved refugees who have had to flee their own country.” By the end of 1992, UNHCR was engaged in what her Special Envoy Mendiluce called “the largest, most complex and risky operation...ever undertaken by humanitarian organizations.” What was understood by lead agency was unclear then and remained so during the next two years. There was no standard agreement spelling out the necessary duties. As UNHCR interpreted them, they included “prime responsibility for logistics/transport, food monitoring, domestic needs, shelter, community services, health, emergency transition activities in agriculture and income generation, protection/legal assistance, and assistance to other agencies in sectors under their responsibility.” UNHCR saw its task as assuring that the full range of needs among the uprooted throughout the region 26
were met. While the High Commissioner turned early on to WHO, UNICEF, and WFP to become operational partners in the effort, UNHCR ended by assuming operational responsibilities for many of these activities, as described below. UNHCR soon comprised the largest civilian presence in the former Yugoslavia. Its numbers grew from 19 in December 1991 to 80 in May, 125 in September, and 337 in December 1992. There were 563 UNHCR international staff members on duty in March 1993, including 217 international and 346 local staff members but excluding 139 truck drivers in the UNHCR transport fleet. About half of the 217 were regular UNHCR staff—the balance had been provided from other organizations and agencies. By mid-November, the ranks had swelled to 678, comprised of 226 international and 452 local staff members—a 35-fold increase in two years. More than 15 percent of UNHCR’s total staff were engaged in the Yugoslav crisis. The pressure took its toll. During a thirteen-month period beginning in September 1992, UNHCR and other humanitarian personnel were involved in 660 separate security incidents. Nine UNHCR staff members or staff associated with UNHCR’s operations were killed. The toll was even higher among soldiers: 58 UNPROFOR soldiers were killed, half of them in war-related incidents. Thirty-four journalists lost their lives. There were also casualties and fatalities among NGOs. At a time when there were roughly 18 million recognized refugees around the world, the former Yugoslavia became the organization’s largest single assignment. In 1992, when UNHCR requested $295.4 million in funds for Yugoslav operations, the next largest program, Afghanistan repatriation, was budgeted at $62 million. UNHCR’s exposure, however, was more than financial. The widening war and the deepening humanitarian cataclysm absorbed the time and energy of many senior professionals. The High Commissioner began to call herself “the desk officer for the former Yugoslavia.” The first Special Envoy of the High Commissioner arrived on the scene in late November 1991, he later recalled, on a onemonth assignment with one assistant and a laptop computer. In a matter of months, UNHCR had developed and assumed 27
Page 1 and 2: Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
Page 3: CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7: accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9: areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 16 and 17: “We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33: quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37: ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 56 and 57: national NGOs resident in Serbia an
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92:
with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94:
humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96:
here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98:
fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100:
Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102:
ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104:
had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106:
Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108:
some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110:
In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
Page 143 and 144:
political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
Page 149 and 150:
ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
Page 151 and 152:
Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
Page 173 and 174:
the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
Page 181:
167
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