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national NGOs resident in Serbia and fewer still whose programs addressed the needs of Serbs confirmed for the Belgrade authorities their perceptions of the prevailing politicization of humanitarian action in the region. NGO activities developed greater cohesiveness in the former Yugoslavia than in many other major emergency operations. That evolution reflected security constraints faced by all NGO programs but also coordination efforts by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA). In Zagreb, Split, and Geneva, ICVA served as a forum for regular meetings of the entire NGO community. In Zagreb, it provided an umbrella for working groups in major sectors such as food, shelter, health, logistics, and social services. Attended by at least a dozen agencies each, these groups fostered coordination among NGOs as well as communication with U.N. agencies, including UNHCR, which provided space and other inkind support. Using a tailor-made electronic bulletin board, ICVA also developed innovative interactive communication among concerned agencies in the region and elsewhere. In terms of scale of activity and numbers of personnel, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was second only to the UNHCR. As with UNHCR, the ICRC’s program for the former Yugoslavia was its largest, representing in 1993 about half of its budget. By the fall, it had 202 international delegates in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, augmented by 790 local employees. Its 29 offices were situated in each of the seven former republics, served by a network of 24 warehouses and a fleet of almost 300 vehicles. The ICRC had about one hundred protection staff members on the ground, far more than UNHCR. ICRC activities included visiting persons detained by the various warring parties, providing food, medical, and other assistance to civilian populations, helping to assure potable water, and facilitating contacts between separated family members. In Bosnia and Herzegovina alone, the ICRC during the first nine months of 1993 distributed 32,000 tons of relief supplies to about 600,000 persons each month, supplied 215 medical facilities with medicines and surgical supplies, and exchanged two million family messages. Some of its activities were undertaken in partnership with national and local Red 42
Cross and Red Crescent societies. About one third of its international staff was provided by national societies. Given its worldwide mandate under the Geneva Conventions and Protocols to assist and protect non-combatants in situations of internal and international armed conflict, the ICRC found the terrain and obstacles familiar. Nevertheless, the Yugoslav experience proved one of the most trying in its more than 125 years. Following the killing of one of its delegates near Sarajevo in May 1992, it temporarily suspended work. Returning in July, it encountered recurring obstruction from all parties. Not given as a rule to public statements or denunciations, the ICRC’s criticism of the belligerents was more outspoken in this conflict than in others. For philosophical and practical reasons, the ICRC in the former Yugoslavia, as elsewhere, kept its distance from the U.N.’s humanitarian, political, and military activities alike. Preferring to pursue its assistance and protection work independently, it carried out its own negotiations with local authorities. It was unwilling to be associated with the use of economic or military force, and it did not request protection from UNPROFOR troops, although it did submit its shipments to the Sanctions Committee for approval. Unlike many of the NGOs that served as the U.N.’s partners, the ICRC made little use of available United Nations air and ground transport. Related Political and Military Actors As lead agency, UNHCR was also the focal point for a variety of relationships between the civilian humanitarian network and several sets of political and military actors. These actors included the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, the U.N. Secretary-General, UNPROFOR, the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), CSCE, NATO, and the Western European Union (WEU). The political and military authorities of the belligerents were also factors. Some of these actors carried out humanitarian activities themselves, and all adopted important humanitarian policies. Like UNHCR, the Security Council found itself largely consumed by the Yugoslav crisis. Between September 25, 1991, when it imposed an embargo on deliveries of weapons 43
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Occasional Paper #18 HUMANITARIAN A
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CONTENTS Foreword .................
Page 6 and 7: accountable is the United Nations f
Page 8 and 9: areas within the former Yugoslavia.
Page 10 and 11: The deteriorating social situation
Page 12 and 13: IRC LWF MSF NATO NGO ODA ODPR OFDA
Page 14 and 15: xiv
Page 16 and 17: “We got our own hands dirty in th
Page 18 and 19: civilian populations beyond areas i
Page 20 and 21: European Union on November 1, 1993
Page 22 and 23: with its concern for minority popul
Page 24 and 25: U.N. put as much effort into stoppi
Page 26 and 27: No. of displaced / refugees 200,000
Page 28 and 29: How many persons were reached by U.
Page 30 and 31: the entire population of central Bo
Page 32 and 33: quantitative data to qualitative ju
Page 34 and 35: denied access to the centers where
Page 36 and 37: ing proceeded uninterrupted. In the
Page 38 and 39: also difficult. Human Rights Watch,
Page 40 and 41: UNHCR as Lead Agency UNHCR received
Page 42 and 43: primary responsibility for the wide
Page 44 and 45: wars, the terrain was more familiar
Page 46 and 47: * Joint Appeals (UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO
Page 48 and 49: teur it appointed was given more au
Page 50 and 51: port of third-country nationals bac
Page 52 and 53: followed locally. It became more di
Page 54 and 55: had two principal contacts: the gov
Page 58 and 59: and military equipment to Yugoslavi
Page 60 and 61: Montenegro because the Federal Repu
Page 62 and 63: munity played a major role in polit
Page 65 and 66: CHAPTER 3: TEN CENTRAL POLICY CHALL
Page 67 and 68: homeless and lower-income pensioner
Page 69 and 70: international community,” recalle
Page 71 and 72: electricity up and running was unde
Page 73 and 74: UNICEF, charged with the survival a
Page 75 and 76: Relief and Beyond Two issues emerge
Page 77 and 78: ties away from the areas of fightin
Page 79 and 80: sons forced to flee intolerable cir
Page 81 and 82: evacuees to 30,000 bodies.” The i
Page 83 and 84: war in which human displacement was
Page 85 and 86: Based on interviews and observation
Page 87 and 88: tarian organizations did their best
Page 89 and 90: eneficiary population had been reac
Page 91 and 92: with 113 persons, including two WHO
Page 93 and 94: humanitarian access. A lot of time
Page 95 and 96: here than in any previous conflict
Page 97 and 98: fered at a “lower price” would
Page 99 and 100: Third, and perhaps the most visible
Page 101 and 102: ity and seriousness of the U.N.’s
Page 103 and 104: had to adapt to UNPROFOR rather tha
Page 105 and 106: Serbian aggressors is not effective
Page 107 and 108:
some of those persons who have alre
Page 109 and 110:
In a letter sent in June 1993 to th
Page 111 and 112:
indirect extermination of the whole
Page 113 and 114:
insisting on a presence in Serb-hel
Page 115 and 116:
has exactly the same problems—lac
Page 117 and 118:
Yugoslavia lends urgency to address
Page 119 and 120:
town of Srebrenica.” DHA’s atte
Page 121 and 122:
population at risk. The numbers wer
Page 123 and 124:
tions would also have been construc
Page 125 and 126:
observed, the situation was reverse
Page 127 and 128:
erly preceded by interagency assess
Page 129 and 130:
Local Resources Recent humanitarian
Page 131 and 132:
the ground rules for dealing with t
Page 133 and 134:
standably dismayed by the time pree
Page 135 and 136:
10. Assisting Civilians without Pro
Page 137 and 138:
sanctions against the Federal Repub
Page 139 and 140:
that the drops were a bad idea but
Page 141 and 142:
CHAPTER 4: RECOMMENDATIONS Several
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political, and military entities. O
Page 145 and 146:
ferently. The interface between the
Page 147 and 148:
takings ultimately rely. Second, we
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ANNEX 1 PERSONS INTERVIEWED * UNITE
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Stephanie Allen Early Joan Edwards
Page 153 and 154:
Karen Kenny Peter Kessler Mostafa K
Page 155 and 156:
Jacques Mouchet Sadako Ogata Pierre
Page 157 and 158:
Serge Telle Tatjania Termacic Sonya
Page 159 and 160:
Derek Boothby Shannon Boyd David Cr
Page 161 and 162:
Marc van Wynsberghe Civil Affairs O
Page 163 and 164:
Ann Grant Rita Hudson Zlatko Hurtic
Page 165 and 166:
Martin Damery Ursula K. Eugster Car
Page 167 and 168:
Arthur Helton John Hicks Lidia Himi
Page 169 and 170:
Jan Williamson Roger Winter John Wo
Page 171 and 172:
ANNEX 2 CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS
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the ICRC suspended relief operation
Page 175 and 176:
Summer 1993. In May, fighting betwe
Page 177 and 178:
ANNEX 3 TEAM MEMBERS Jeffrey Clark,
Page 179 and 180:
ANNEX 4 ABOUT THE HUMANITARIANISM A
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167
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