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FOI-R--<strong>3880</strong>--SE<br />
European Union. This could in the long run facilitate the development of a<br />
common format for agreeing principles of free trade from the Pacific to the<br />
Atlantic. Beyond this, some optimistic pundits argue for an even wider<br />
integration – a Great Eurasian Union including China, India and even Iran<br />
(Toma, 2012).<br />
POST-ISAF AFGHANISTAN – IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL<br />
SECURITY IN CENTRAL ASIA<br />
Despite the withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan in 2014 a significant<br />
foreign military presence will remain in the country. The US will retain key<br />
military installations, combat aircraft, unmanned aircraft and assets for technical<br />
and human intelligence as well as Special Forces units. The government of<br />
Afghanistan in Kabul receives significant amounts of weapons and military<br />
equipment and will not lack ammunition. The Afghan National Security Forces<br />
(ANSF), i.e. the police and the army, are therefore assessed to be able to handle<br />
the Taliban, who without aviation and heavy machinery are unlikely to be able to<br />
carry out decisive military operations but will be limited to low-intensity<br />
guerrilla operations. The American assets that remain are likely to continue to be<br />
the primary target for Afghan opposition forces.<br />
The Taliban forces are likely to keep on fighting the foreign military presence<br />
and will hardly be able to expand operations into neighbouring Central Asian<br />
republics. There are, however, Islamist fighters with citizenship from Central<br />
Asian states in Afghanistan. A potential threat is that some of them may apply<br />
the combat skills and experience gained in Afghanistan at home. The CSTO is<br />
preparing for such scenarios and will be ready in 2014 to repel occasional attacks<br />
by small groups of Taliban.<br />
The main potential for instability in Central Asia lies not in Afghanistan but<br />
within the Central Asian states themselves. The reasons for this are their high<br />
levels of poverty, unemployment, corruption and poor governance. Obviously,<br />
the CSTO is not intended to handle such threats. Authorities in the Central Asian<br />
republics will exaggerate the danger of extremism from Afghanistan and try to<br />
connect it to the political opposition in each country. Central Asian leaders will<br />
probably try to harness the CSTO’s support to increase their own legitimacy in<br />
fighting domestic opposition.<br />
The widespread notion that the Central Asian republics are interested in using<br />
economic projects to integrate Afghanistan into the region is exaggerated. It<br />
reflects the wishes of the West, rather than the aspirations of the East. The<br />
peoples of Central Asia are more interested in isolating Afghanistan, which lives<br />
in a different era, with an alien culture and different values. Infrastructure<br />
projects between the Central Asian republics and Afghanistan are limited to<br />
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan and the neighbouring provinces of Afghanistan where<br />
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