foir_3880

FOI-R--3880--SE
ISLAMISM, EXTREMISM AND THE XUAR
For the Chinese government the threat of extremism, terrorism and separatist
movements striving for an independent XUAR is of key concern. The continued
cohesion of the People’s Republic of China is not only a question of state
integrity but it is also directly linked to the Communist Party’s claim to power.
Any movement or group striving to decouple the XUAR from China poses a
direct challenge to Party legitimacy and cannot be tolerated.
The problems in the XUAR are not new and precede any current policy
initiatives related to the western neighbourhood. The fears of revolts and
invasions emanating from tribes and nations in Central Asia run back centuries.
During Soviet times large scale military defence was a primary prism through
which Beijing viewed its western territory. With the end of the Soviet Union the
need to focus on large scale military defence in Xinjiang disappeared. Instead
initiating relations with new neighbours became a focus. The rise of Islamist
inspired movements as a result of the Afghan wars, especially the Taliban, would
increasingly influence policy formulation vis-à-vis the region from the mid
1990’s and onwards. Chinese authorities see unrest, for example the 2009 riots in
Urumqi, as proof that Islamist ideology if not jihad fighters, are being exported
from hot spots in Central Asia to XUAR (Lee 2009a) and act accordingly. Since
2013 concerns about extreme Islamism have become more pressing for Chinese
authorities. This is not only due to escalating violence in the XUAR but also
because violent attacks have been launched in other parts of China. In the eyes of
the authorities the risk of an expansion of conservative Islamic and violent prone
ideology across ethnic divides is a very worrying trend.
A two-pronged approach has been taken internally. First, the party has drawn the
conclusion that economic development is the key instrument in promoting party
legitimacy (Pantucci and Petersen, 2013). Thus if the west of the country can be
developed it will be “won”. Content people with jobs and income have no reason
to challenge the system. Thus China launched a “Go West” policy around 1999
when Jiang Zemin proclaimed that the Central Committee had endorsed a
development program for Western China (Lee, 2009b). The focus was on
infrastructure projects with the aim of drawing the west into and linking it with
the eastern trade flows. Yet progress during the first ten years was not as hoped
for with the western regions lagging behind and attention still focused on the
more prosperous foreign trade flowing out of the East. In 2010 a renewal of the
Go West policy was attempted, possibly in the light of growing discontent in
China (Moxley, 2010). The second internal response has been to tighten security
and this is where China has seen the need to revamp its relationship with its
western neighbours.
Thus, internal Chinese threat perceptions have come to shape and influence
relations with the neighbouring states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan
and Pakistan. From this perspective the formation of the SCO and its early focus
87